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While state-owned enterprises play an instrumental role in economic development, 
they are a significant fiscal risk to the state. This occurs through state-guaranteed 
loans that have more lax credit monitoring, and soft budget constraints, where state-
owned enterprises can increase their debt levels without fear of liquidation or 
bankruptcy. This study empirically investigated the relationship between Eskom’s 
financial performance and its own debt and government debt, using the utility’s 
financial statements and government debt data from 1985 to 2017. The study used 
two models, namely, the Vector Autoregression (VAR) Model and the Error Correction 
Model (ECM) to analyse the data. In terms of the VAR, according to the impulse 
response functions, a one standard deviation shock to the debt-to-GDP ratio has a 
minimal impact on the electricity price, Eskom’s revenue and Eskom debt. Therefore, 
an innovation to the debt-toGDP ratio explains a large proportion of itself, as one 
standard deviation shock to the electricity price has a positive response from Eskom’s 
revenue and its debt. Similarly, a one standard deviation shock to Eskom’s revenue 
has a positive response from the electricity price and Eskom’s debt, and a one 
standard deviation shock to Eskom’s debt has a positive response from the electricity 
price and Eskom’s revenue. The forecast error variance decomposition analysis 
shows that up to 9,17% of the forecast error variance of the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
explained by the electricity price. Government debt relative to GDP explains 32,9% of 
the forecast error variance in the electricity price. The electricity price explains 29,51% 
of the forecast error variance in Eskom’s revenue. The forecast error variance for 
Eskom debt is explained by government debt/GDP which is up to 30,34%. The ECM 
shows that a long run relationship exists between Eskom’s debt relative to government 
debt, Eskom’s revenue relative to the electricity price and Eskom’s staff numbers. The 
study shows that Eskom’s increase in revenue is largely attributed to tariff hikes, state-
guaranteed loans and equity injections, rather than increases in sales. A large 
proportion of government debt is comprised of Eskom debt. The proposed avenue as 
a way forward is partial privatisation or fiscal consolidation.     
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INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Keynes (1936) believed that the accumulation of government debt should only be used 
for public capital expenditure and to stabilise the economy, which is a form of 
decreasing unemployment. More recently, Tanzi (2016) supported this argument by 
noting how Keynes proposed that government borrowing should also have a short 
lifespan, since its primary use is to stabilise the economy in the short term. Therefore, 
Keynes did not advocate for government debt to be used for government consumption 
or transfers, whether for social spending or even public entities.  
However, Alesina and Tabellini (1990) believe that debt accumulation can serve as a 
means of redistributing income over time and across generations. They view debt 
accumulation as a way of reducing the deadweight loss associated with taxes which 
come from the provision of public goods and services. Barro (1979) developed the 
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis (REH) to show that expansionary fiscal policy does 
not have an effect on aggregate demand. His claim was supported by his notion of tax 
smoothing or constant tax rates. However, this is based on the assumption of a 
benevolent government that wants to minimise deadweight loss.  
Some economists even viewed public spending as a growth factor because they 
believe large and sustained fiscal injections are justifiable when the growth rate falls 
below the expected long-term trend. However, Brauninger (2005) notes that there is a 
negative relationship between government debt and economic growth. 
The accumulation of government debt is attractive because unlike taxes, it requires 
little coercion, no administration, and is readily available to repay over an extremely 
long period of time. However, evidence from Buchanan (2008), Tanzi (2016) and 
Hyman (2011) suggests that the burden of public debt is shifted to future generations 
in the form of higher taxes which will be used to pay the interest on the current 
accumulated debt. This will result in lower living standards for future generations, as 
much of the income will go towards taxation. In addition, debt financing also causes a 
decrease in the level of current investment because of higher interest rates on 
loanable funds once the government has increased its demand for these funds. This 
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has the capacity to increase unemployment, since the decrease in the volume of 
investment implies less output and less need for labour (Hyman, 2011).  
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are firms established by government to reach their 
commercial and political objectives. These firms are usually located in industries such 
as electricity, infrastructure, banking and water supply. SOEs have a large global 
footprint and contribute approximately 20% to the global gross domestic product 
(GDP) (World Bank 2014). 
SOEs are also important in providing services to markets in which the private sector 
would consider it too expensive to invest, or in which the private sector would ultimately 
overcharge for the respective goods and services (Lipczynski, Wilson & Goddard, 
2013:701). In addition, SOEs are the only firms which government can use as the 
vehicles of its socio-economic and political objectives.  
While SOEs play an instrumental role in economic development, they also suffer from 
several challenges. Their biggest challenge is the fiscal risk that they pose to the 
government. This occurs mainly through state-guaranteed loans where SOEs are 
given more lax credit monitoring, face soft budget constraints and are able to increase 
their debt levels without fear of liquidation or bankruptcy (World Bank, 2014; Xu, 2012: 
128). Further challenges SOEs face are deteriorating fixed facilities, poor service 
quality, chronic revenue shortages, corporate governance, and large outstanding debt 
levels (Kessides, 2004:2). 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
South Africa’s total government debt in million US Dollars for the period 1985 to 2017 
has shown a steep upward trend. For example, government debt that stood at 
$148 003 million in 1985, has increased to $9 428 208 million in 2017. According to 
the World Bank, South Africa is the most indebted country in Africa (World Bank 
Statistics, 2018). In 2016, South Africa’s external debt data showed that public and 
publicly guaranteed debt was $62 195 million.  
In recent years, the government’s accumulation of debt has been attributed to SOEs. 
The government has been channelling large amounts of funds to Eskom by mostly 
guaranteeing their debt. According to the Public Financial Management Act (PFMA) 
of 1999, one of the functions of the National Treasury is to “promote and enforce 
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transparency and effective management in respect of revenue, expenditure, assets 
and liabilities of departments, public entities and constitutional institutions” (PFMA 
1999:13). According to the National Treasury’s 2018 Budget Review, SOEs, and in 
particular, Eskom, account for the majority of government contingent liabilities. Of all 
public institutions, Eskom accounts for 75% of the guarantees and exposure.  
Eskom’s mounting debt levels, fraud, and corruption cases have also resulted in 
several downgrades from global credit rating agencies such as Moody’s; Standards 
and Poors (S & P), as well as Fitch Ratings (National Treasury Budget Review, 
2018:82). Overall, Eskom’s debt has a significantly negative effect on the country’s 
fiscus.  
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Eskom’s debt has become an albatross for the national revenue fund because the 
government has had to guarantee its debt. The extent of the government’s guarantee 
of its debt is already overstretched, where the utility has borrowed from the state itself, 
the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA), African Development Bank of 
Southern Africa, export credit agencies and the World Bank (DBSA, 2012). This is 
problematic because on the one hand the entire economy is dependent on Eskom, but 
on the other hand, the utility has created a pattern of dependency on the state which 
is widening the government deficit and encourages more borrowing by the 
government.  
According to Hyman (2011), instead of more borrowing, the government can increase 
taxes, which will, however, be detrimental to citizens’ wellbeing. There is a high 
probability of this happening, since the state has explored all possible avenues that 
will give Eskom access to funds, and taxes are also administratively easy to enforce 
(Black, Calitz & Steenekamp, 2015). Thus far the solution to Eskom’s problems has 
been to channel more funds into it, which has not been fruitful.  
While corporate governance (or the lack thereof) is at the forefront of the financial 
crises at Eskom, this study seeks to investigate this from an empirical perspective, 
where the main tool used in the study is Eskom’s financial statements.  
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1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The significance of this study lies in that it will assist the government to inform policy 
decisions about the financial and risk management of Eskom as a contingent liability. 
It is also significant because it can assist the government on the choice of the best 
strategies to decrease its own debt. Ultimately, this study is important because the 
appropriate risk management of Eskom is imperative for South Africa’s economic 
growth through the delivery of a consistent supply of electricity. Lastly, the citing of this 
study can contribute to the dynamic literature on state-owned enterprises and energy, 
which will advance academic knowledge.  
1.5 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
1.5.1 Purpose 
The overall purpose of this study is to investigate and understand the impact of Eskom 
bailouts on government debt. This will be achieved through the objectives, as listed 
below. 
1.5.2 Objectives  
The following objectives have been formulated for this study: 
1. To determine how the financial performance of Eskom affected government debt 
in the period from 1985 to 2017.  
2. To determine how the financial performance of Eskom affected its own debt in 
the period from 1985 to 2017. 
3. To identify the causes of the crisis at Eskom from a financial perspective. 
1.6 HYPOTHESES  
According to the literature on SOEs, as well as the National Treasury’s Budget 
Reviews and Eskom’s financial statements, a relationship exists between Eskom’s 
financial performance, its own debt, and government debt. As such, the hypothesis is 
that all the independent variables, namely, revenue, electricity price, staff numbers, 
the current ratio and debt-to-assets ratio, have a relationship with the two dependent 
variables, government debt and Eskom debt.  
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Therefore, the following hypotheses were formulated for this study: 
Model 1 
𝐻0 : Eskom’s financial performance has no effect on government debt.  
𝐻1 : Eskom’s financial performance has an effect on government debt.  
Model 2 
𝐻0 : Eskom’s financial performance has no effect on Eskom debt. 
𝐻1 : Eskom’s financial performance has an effect on Eskom debt. 
1.7 METHODOLOGY 
This empirical study employed both a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model and an 
Error Correction Model (ECM). The application of the VAR was adopted from the work 
done by Lütkepohl (2006), on the use of impulse response functions and forecast error 
decomposition analysis.  
The ECM was pioneered by Engle and Granger (1981) and is based on the 
phenomenon of cointegration (Harris 1995; Asteriou & Hall, 2016). Once cointegration 
is established, the ECM is constructed through various steps which include estimating 
a long run equation which includes a short run component. Post-diagnostic tests are 
run to ensure that the model is homoscedastic, contains no serial correlation, is 
correctly specified, and that its residuals are normally distributed.   
1.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study was conducted with diligence and an aim to be concise and academically 
defendable. However, any scientific research has a few shortcomings.   
• This study collected data from Eskom’s financial statements from 1985 to 2017. 
Prior to 2001, companies had to use the International Accounting Standards (IAS), 
and afterwards, the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
Therefore, between 1985 and 2000, companies used IAS, and from 2001 to date, 
companies are using IFRS. As such, there is a difference in the layout of the 
financial statements between these two periods.  
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• Eskom was listed in 2005. Prior to 2005, it functioned as a government entity 
exempt from taxes. This means Eskom’s revenue and profits after 2005 are 
affected by taxes, such as company tax and income tax. 
• The study considered using Eskom’s working capital as another variable to 
represent productivity. However, upon the author’s calculations, Eskom’s working 
capital was found to be negative.  
• The following variables were generated: revenue/price (revenue from price 
changes); government debt/GDP (debt-to-GDP ratio); Eskom debt/government 
debt (Eskom debt as a proportion of government debt). The risk of using derived 
variables is that they may lead to inconsistent results. This is because they have 
been generated by the author and may result in some differences that deviate 
from the actual value of the variables.  
Even though the study had its limitations, they did not have a significant bearing on 
the study’s theoretical framework or empirical findings. 
1.9 ORGANISATION OF STUDY 
In order for the purpose and objectives of the study to be achieved, the study was 
organised in the following way:  
Chapter 1: Introduction to the study  
This chapter provided a comprehensive introduction, background and problem 
statement of the study. The chapter introduced the Keynesian theory of government 
debt as the point departure because it opposes government borrowing to support 
public entities. SOEs, their advantages, disadvantages and shortcomings were 
discussed, followed by details of the aims and objectives of the study, the hypothesis, 
methodology, limitations and the organisation of the study.  
Chapter 2: An overview of state-owned enterprises, South African debt, and the 
Eskom crisis  
This chapter gives a thorough account of South Africa’s government debt, state-owned 
enterprises and the Eskom crisis. The chapter presents a broad outline of state-owned 
enterprises which is followed by a concise discussion of the role of the National 
Treasury and its duties as guided by the PFMA (1999). It also provides a number of 
tabular information on the country’s public institutions, their guarantees and exposure. 
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The chronology of Eskom as a company is also given from the 1970s to date. The 
1980s’ De Villiers commission highlighted the first erroneous state intervention which 
recommended that Eskom should not charge cost-reflective prices. The rest of the 
chapter discusses Eskom’s building programme, historical average electricity prices, 
and its balance sheet. The chapter concludes with a discussion of international 
lessons regarding the power sector.  
Chapter 3: Theoretical and empirical literature review  
This chapter discusses the theoretical and empirical literature review of the study. It 
starts by clarifying that the study uses several theories to justify its empirical models. 
The focus of this study is on the relationship between the financial performance of 
Eskom and government debt, where government debt is the dependent variable. The 
Keynesian theory of government debt, its own debt and government debt is used to 
justify the use of government debt as a variable in the study. The second part of the 
chapter discusses various theories and the empirical literature that support the 
independent variables of the study. The theories are the neoclassical theory of the 
firm, the Miller and Modigliani theory, agency theory, stakeholder theory and the new 
institutional economics approach. The independent variables are revenue, price, staff, 
Eskom debt, and the current ratio and debt-to-assets ratio.  
Chapter 4: Methodology   
This chapter provides a strong methodological background to the study. The two 
empirical models used in the study were the VAR and ECM. The VAR model uses 
impulse response functions and forecast error decomposition analysis as the tools of 
the model’s analysis. The ECM is constructed based on the assumption of 
cointegration amongst the long-run variables. After cointegration had been 
established, the ECM was constructed by taking into consideration the cointegrating 
component. Lastly, diagnostic tests were applied to the ECM to ensure that the model 
conformed to the conditions of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) properties. The tests 
conducted were to ensure that there were homoskedasticity, no autocorrelation, no 
misspecification, and to ensure that the residuals of the ECM were normally 
distributed.  
Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis  
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This chapter presents an outline of the results from the VAR and ECM. The results are 
discussed in accordance with the procedure of each model. However, prior to that, 
descriptive statistics, graphical analysis and unit root tests were conducted on all the 
variables used in the study. The unit root tests used were the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron test. The VAR was estimated by determining the 
appropriate lag length and assessing the AR roots graph and table. The model was 
finally interpreted using impulse response functions and forecast error decomposition 
analysis. According to the notion of stationarity, it was expected that the variables in 
the VAR were all mean reverting. The ECM was also constructed using the two-step 
Engle Granger cointegration test, after which post estimation diagnostics were run.   
Chapter 6: Conclusion  
The study is concluded by this chapter where it reviews how the results have achieved 
the objectives. Recommendations of the study and areas of further research are also 




AN OVERVIEW OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, SOUTH 
AFRICAN DEBT AND THE ESKOM CRISIS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the background of the study. It starts with 
Section 2.2 which unpacks the notion of state-owned enterprises, including their 
positive and negative aspects. Section 2.3 is a discussion of South Africa’s 
government debt. Section 2.4 presents a chronological discussion of Eskom from 1922 
to the present day. The section includes significant events like the oil crisis, the De 
Villiers Commission and the Energy White Paper. Section 2.5 presents a more 
narrowed focus on Eskom’s building programme which started in 2005, and load 
shedding which became more prevalent from 2008. Section 2.6, which is the crux of 
the study, discusses Eskom’s financial statements, more specifically, its debt-to-
assets ratio and current ratio. Eskom’s debt, which is at the heart of this study’s 
research problem, is also discussed in this section. Section 2.7 discusses corporate 
governance as a critical tool to any company’s management structure. Section 2.8 
discusses the privatisation of electricity in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United 
States of America (USA), and Section 2.9 concludes the chapter.  
2.2 STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are firms established by government to achieve the 
commercial and political objectives of the state. SOEs are usually located in industries 
such as electricity, infrastructure, banking and water supply. They have a large global 
footprint and contribute approximately 20% to global GDP (World Bank, 2014).  
There are more positive than negative elements associated with SOEs. For example, 
in 2012, SOEs in North Africa and the Middle East accounted for 20-50% of value 
added, and 30% of total employment in the region (World Bank, 2014). In addition, in 
Indonesia, 150 SOEs account for 15-40% of its GDP (World Bank, 2014). These 
statistics indicate that SOEs still contribute to economic development, regardless of 
their regions and country of development.   
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SOEs are also important in providing markets in which the private sector would 
consider it too expensive to invest, or in which the private sector would ultimately 
overcharge for the respective goods and services (Lipczynski et al., 2013:701). In 
addition, SOEs are the only firms which government can use as vehicles of socio-
economic and political objectives. Eskom’s electricity supply in South Africa is one 
such example.  
While SOEs play an instrumental role in economic development, they also experience 
several challenges. Their biggest challenge is the fiscal risk that they present to the 
government. This occurs mainly through state-guaranteed loans, where SOEs are 
given more lax credit monitoring, face soft budget constraints, and are able to increase 
their debt levels without fear of liquidation or bankruptcy (World Bank, 2014; Xu, 
2012:128). In a study comparing how the government and state-owned banks 
allocated credit to SOEs from 1980 to 1994, Cull and Xu (2002:533) found that direct 
government transfers were not significantly associated with profitability.  
There is also little, to no, incentive for managers in SOEs to achieve full productivity, 
and the remuneration of managers is also not dependent on the organisation’s 
performance. Therefore, there is also little incentive for sales maximisation, profit 
maximisation or even growth maximisation (Lipczynski et al., 2013:701). Using 
accounting numbers, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001:320) conducted a large-sample 
cross-sectional comparison of SOEs and privately owned corporations from 1975 – 
1995. They found that SOEs are less profitable than private firms. Although this study 
was conducted more than 20 years ago, the results are still comparable between 
private firms and SOEs today. Further challenges among SOEs are deteriorating fixed 
facilities, poor service quality, chronic revenue shortages, corporate governance, and 
large outstanding debt levels (Kessides, 2004:2).  
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the challenges of SOEs, and specifically, 
those of Eskom, it is important to undertake empirical analysis. Many empirical studies 
support the literature on the challenges of SOEs. Using a sample of 85 companies 
from 28 industrialised countries that went through public share offerings for the period 
1990-1996, D’souza and Megginson (1999) found that SOEs have lower profitability, 
lower output, lower operating efficiency, as well as high-level ratios, in comparison to 
their private counterparts. Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994:403) also 
found similar results after using the panel data of 61 companies across 18 countries 
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from 1961 to 1990. They also found that only after being privatised do companies 
decrease debt levels, increase sales volumes, become more profitable, increase 
capital investment and operating efficiency.    
According to the Department of Public Enterprises (2018), hereafter, DPE, in South 
Africa there are six SOEs directly owned by the government, namely, Transnet, Denel, 
Alexkor, South African Express, South African Forestry Companies Limited (SAFCOL) 
and Eskom.  












































8,057 177,136 65,478 2,327 1,014 386 
Net Profit/Loss 
(millions)  
333 800 2,765 (202) 114 6 
Source: DPE Annual Performance Plan 2017/2018 
Table 2.1 above shows the net profits/ revenues and losses for these six SOEs in 
2017. An unaudited report of the SA Express financial statements has revealed a net 
loss of R202 million, with only a measly profit of R2,327 million when compared to 
other SOEs. Safcol and Alexkor are in a poorer financial standing with only R1,014 
million and R386 million in revenue respectively.  
According to the DPE’s Annual Performance Plan for the 2017/2018 financial year, 
SOEs are experiencing severe financial, operational and governance challenges.  
The last decade has shown a considerable lack of financial performance by SOEs in 
South Africa which has required constant intervention from the government. This 
intervention has generally been in the form of bailouts, where the state has 
consistently been channelling funds into underperforming SOEs. The SOE which has 
received exceptionally high bailouts is Eskom.  
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2.3 SOUTH AFRICA’S PUBLIC DEBT  
The National Treasury is the custodian of South Africa’s National Revenue Fund, and 
is responsible for managing the government’s finances (National Treasury, 2019). One 
of its other roles, which relates to SOEs, is ensuring sustainable public financial 
management and maintaining good governance. However, even though this is the 
case, SOEs have put strain on the role of the National Treasury because of the 
pressures they exert on the fiscus.  
According to the Public Financial Management Act (PFMA) No.1 of 1999, the national 
government is allowed to borrow for five of the following reasons (National Treasury 
2008; PFMA 1999):  
1. Financing the national budget deficit; 
2. Refinancing maturing debt or a loan redeemed before the maturity date; 
3. To obtain foreign currency; 
4. To maintain credit balances on a bank account of the National Revenue Fund; and  
5. To regulate the domestic money situation should the need arise. 
While the PFMA has clearly stipulated the reasons for borrowing, Treasury has 
conceded that although in theory they should borrow only to finance capital 
expenditure, government’s total debt also includes debt to finance current expenditure. 
Borrowing is also being used to provide state-guaranteed loans, mostly for Eskom.   
A government guarantee is a loan that a third party agrees to in the event that the 
borrower defaults, while exposure is how much of the guarantee the borrower uses 
(Liu, Lyu & Yu, 2017). According to Julies (2018), the combined financial position of 
public institutions has been weak, while their government guarantee and exposure 
have been high and increasing every financial year.  
Table 2.2 shows all public institutions’, the total government guarantee and exposure. 
Amongst all the public institutions, Eskom constitutes on average, 75% of government 
guarantees and exposure. This shows how much of a contingent liability Eskom is to 
the public purse.  
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Table 2.2: Government guarantees and exposure  
R billion 2015/2016 2016/2017 2017/2018 
Guarantee Exposure Guarantee Exposure Guarantee Exposure 
Public Institutions of which:  469,9 255,8 475,7 290,4 466,0 300,4 
Eskom  350,0 174,6 350,0 202,8 350,0 220,8 
SANRAL 38,9 27,2 38,9 29,4 38,9 30,1  
Trans-Caledon Authority 25,8 21,2 25,6 20,9 25,7 18,7 
SAA 14,4 14,4 19,1 17,8 19,1 11,8 
Land & Agricultural Bank of South Africa  6,6 5,3 11,1 3,8 9,6 6,6 
DBSA 13,9 4,4 12,5 4,1 12,3 4,2 
SA Post Office 4,4 1,3 4,4 4,0 0,4 0,4 
Transnet 3,5 3,8 3,5 3,8 3,5 3,8 
Denel 1,9 1,9 1,9 1,9 2,4 2,3 
SA Express 1,1 0,5 1,1 0,8 0,8 0,8 
IDC 2,0 0,2 0,4 0,2 0,5 0,1 
SARB 3,0 - 3,0 - - - 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) 200,2 111,4 200,2 125,8 200,2 122,2 
Public-Private Partnerships 10,3 10,3 10,0 10,0 9,6 9,6 
Source: Julies (2018) 
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According to Julies (2018) and Everaert, Fouad, Martin and Velloso (2009), SOEs’ 
financial pressures lead to several fiscal risks, namely, macroeconomic risk, direct 
funding pressure, and the build-up of long-term liabilities. When SOEs face revenue 
underperformance this worsens the government’s fiscal ratios and leads to adverse 
macroeconomic pressures, such as high inflation and weaker economic growth. Their 
underperformance also leads to negative pressure from sovereign credit ratings 
(Paton, 2019).  
As a remedial measure, the state can resort to tax increases or spending cuts to 
channel funds to the respective public institutions. This can have a negative effect on 
service delivery and economic growth. It can also create a tax burden which 
undermines social equity (Hyman, 2011; Rawdanowicz, Wurzel & Christensen, 2013).  
South Africa faced significant credit downgrades in 2017 from the top four global rating 
agencies, Fitch; Moody’s; Ratings & Investment Information, Inc., as well as Standard 
& Poors (S&P) (National Treasury Budget Review, 2018:82). This was due to low 
economic growth and the policy uncertainty surrounding SOEs, particularly Eskom. As 
a result, the respective agencies categorised South Africa’s economy according the 
statuses in Table 2.3, where their outlook was between stable and negative (Chartered 
Financial Institute, 2017:12-13).  
Table 2.3: South African credit downgrades in 2017 
































Source: National Treasury (2018) 
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The National Treasury has maintained a prudent management of debt to increase its 
borrowing requirement, regardless of its debt challenges. However, along with 
inflation, exchange rate risk, and global interest rates, the National Treasury cites its 
fiscal position as one of the risks to its financial strategy. By fiscal position, they refer 
to increases in the fiscal deficit or calls on guarantees to, or bailouts for, state-owned 
companies (National Treasury, 2018: 23).  
 
Figure 2.1: South Africa’s overall national government debt (R millions) 
Source: Quantec Easy Data (2019) 
Figure 2.1 shows South Africa’s overall national government debt from 1985 to 2017. 
Since 1985, national government debt has been steadily increasing. The steady 
increase has been from R44, 0327 million in 1985 to R123, 7931 million in 1991. From 
1992, the increases in national government debt have been increasing at a faster rate, 
with the sharpest increase being from 2008 at R712, 1567 million, and reaching its 
peak at R280, 524, 56 million in 2017. Since then, the increase in the debt has been 
steep.  
While it is noteworthy to attribute the large increase in national debt to SOEs, another 
factor must be mentioned. From 1989 to 1994, the government improved the actuarial 
funding of the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) (Calitz, Du Plessis & 
Siebrits, 2011). The interest burden on government debt has also increased 
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Breytenbach (2018), these costs increased from R52,9 billion in 2007/2008 to 
R187,8  billion in 2018/2019.   
Everaert et al. (2009) note that fiscal risks can arise when the government constantly 
intervenes to rescue underperforming SOEs, which is the case with the Treasury and 
Eskom. However, the state has to intervene to remedy this mounting fiscal challenge. 
Julies (2018) postulates three options for dealing with SOEs in distress:  
• Firstly, he suggests the issuing of new guarantees which will lead to a build-up of 
unserviceable debt. However, this may not be possible because lenders will not 
be willing to extend more credit, despite the guarantee from the state.  
• Secondly, he suggests supporting an entity only by paying its interest payments. 
This sounds more effective at reducing the upward trend in government debt.  
• The third option is an outright bailout. Although this can be positive in that the 
SOE will no longer have unsustainable debt, an outright bailout is a strong 
indicator that they may need another bailout again in the future. 
However, there is a fourth fiscal option that appears to have desirable results, and it 
can be found in the growing literature on fiscal consolidation. Fiscal consolidation is a 
package of instruments which a state can use to decrease its accumulation of debt. A 
state qualifies for fiscal consolidation if it has high inflation, weak economic growth, 
and high debt. Rawdanowicz et al. (2013) and Alesina (2012) advocate for 
consolidation through spending or a ‘fiscal squeeze’.  
Rawdanowicz et al. (2013) note that when fiscal consolidation is implemented from an 
expenditure perspective, the main instrument utilised for this is the reduction in 
government transfers. While this may have negative effects on transfers, such as 
social grants and unemployment benefits, it will have a positive effect on the fiscus by 
reducing transfers to SOEs. A large spending cut to SOEs can lower the debt-to-GDP 
ratio and is less detrimental to the economy.  
2.4 ESKOM  
In order to get the full context of the events leading to Eskom being a fiscal risk to the 
state, this section will present a chronological discussion of Eskom, starting at 1922 
and ending at 2019. The timeline will include the following topics: Eskom’s historical 
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background; the oil crisis; the De Villiers commission; Energy White Paper; Eskom’s 
building programme and load shedding.  
2.4.1 Historical background 
The name Eskom is derived from ESCOM, the English acronym for the ‘Electricity 
Supply Commission’, as it was previously known (McDonald, 2008). Not only has the 
utility been instrumental in the success of the mining industry, but also in industrial 
development as a whole in South Africa (Eberhard, 2004). 
Eskom is a vertically integrated power utility, and since its inception in 1922 by the 
Electricity Control Board, its structure has largely remained unchanged. In 1948, 
Eskom bought out the last major private generator of electricity, thereby extinguishing 
its competition. Eskom, therefore, is  a monopoly in the South African electricity supply 
industry, and its supply chain includes electricity generation, transmission and 
distribution (Eberhard 2004; Gigler & McMillan, 2018:1).  
Eskom has 13 coal-fired power stations which account for 85% of Eskom’s total net 
capacity. They are Arnot, Camden, Duvha, Grootvlei, Hendrina, Kendal, Komati, Kriel, 
Matla, Tutuka, Majuba, Lethabo and Matimba. All the stations are located in 
Mpumalanga, except for Lethabo and Matimba that are located in the Free State and 
Limpopo, respectively (Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), 2012; Eskom, 
2018b).  
Eskom’s other 10 power stations generate electricity through gas, hydroelectricity, 
nuclear energy, renewables and thermal energy. The gas and nuclear-powered 
stations, including Eskom’s wind farm, are all in the Western Cape. The hydro stations 
are in the Northern Cape and on the border of the Free State and Eastern Cape. 
Eskom also owns 300 000 kilometres of national transmission lines, while it shares the 
distribution chain with a few local municipalities (DBSA, 2012).  
Figure 2.2 (on the next page) shows South Africa’s electricity infrastructure network. 
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Figure 2.2: South Africa’s electricity infrastructure network 
Source: Development Bank of South Africa (2012)  
As a monopoly, Eskom has competitive advantage in the power industry because of 
its capital, technology, infrastructure, assets, size, and number of years in operation 
(Varian, 2010, Klimczak, 2007). As such, there are significant barriers to entry in the 
electricity supply industry. Since the power sector has outright imperfect competition, 
it is important that is has a regulator.  
The official regulator of the electricity industry is the National Energy Regulator of 
South Africa (NERSA). Its mission, according to the National Energy Regulator Act of 
2004, is “to regulate the energy industry in accordance with government laws and 
policies, standards and international best practices in support of sustainable and 
orderly development” (NERSA, 2018:1). NERSA, among its other responsibilities, is 
the regulator involved in approving or declining applications for electricity tariff 
increases or decreases from Eskom.  
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2.4.2 Oil crisis 
The oil crisis of 1973 was an opportune event for Eskom as it led to a sharp increase 
in its customer base. This was due to the fact that customers changed to electricity, 
as other fossil fuels, such as oil and gas, became too expensive (Steyn, 2016). This 
increase in consumer demand for electricity meant that Eskom had to initially decrease 
prices in order to capture the market. However, as the demand increased even further, 
it was forced to raise prices to expand the number of generation plants, and ultimately 
maintain supply.  
Steyn (2016) notes that because of this, electricity prices increased by 70% in real 
terms between 1974 and 1978. Since electricity generation at this time depended 
largely on coal, it was expensive to maintain power plants without increasing prices. 
The Government Technical Advisory Centre (GTAC), an agency of the National 
Treasury, has reported that when comparing the cost of power generation 
technologies, coal and nuclear generation are the most expensive (GTAC, 2018). 
Subsequently, there was another increase in prices in 1983.  
2.4.3 De Villiers Commission  
In 1984, there was a revolt against the electricity price increase by Eskom in 1983. 
This resulted in protests dubbed “Stop the Rot”. The government was then forced to 
intervene, and it did so by appointing the De Villiers Commission to evaluate Eskom’s 
operational and financial management. Kantor (1988) highlights the fact that the De 
Villiers Commission advocated for debt management driven tariffs. It recommended 
that Eskom should not charge prices which are cost-reflective, but should rather 
charge prices that are consumer-privileged. This was due to the government believing 
that South Africans could not afford to pay electricity tariffs which reflect long-term 
marginal costs. However, one can also deduce that the state was under political 
pressure and sought a quick solution.  
This study cannot overstate enough how much of a blunder this was on the part of 
government. Eskom is in a crisis today because it has not charged cost-reflective 
tariffs since 1984, and this has proved to be unsustainable. Deon Joubert, a Chartered 
Accountant (SA), who is a member of the cost-structuring team at Eskom, expressed 
the same sentiment at a recent seminar hosted by the University of South Africa’s 
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(UNISA’s) Economics department (UNISA, 2019). He also advocates for electricity 
prices that are cost-reflective and that will enable Eskom to pull itself out of debt.  
Kantor (1988) further argues that in order to justify investments in generation plants, 
price escalation over time is necessary. He also points out that the De Villiers 
Commission proposed increases in electricity prices only when there is an increase in 
inflation. This recommendation is flawed because if inflation decreases or remains 
generally consistent, it implies there is no inflow of funds for Eskom to maintain its 
generation plants. This compromises Eskom’s financial stability because its debt 
obligations are independent of inflation adjustments. The utility then finds itself with 
increasing debt levels that cannot be offset by revenue.  
On 6 February 1988 an announcement was made that Eskom would be privatised 
(Van der Heijden, 2013). However, a retraction subsequently followed after Eskom did 
its own study and found that privatisation was not feasible.  
Figure 2.3 below is a graphical illustration of the historical average electricity prices (in 
cents per kilowatt) from 1985 to 2017. 
 
Figure 2.3: Historical average electricity prices: 1985-2017  
Source: Eskom Financial Statements (1985-2017) 
Figure 2.3 shows the movements in the electricity price between 1985 and 2017, 
where the red line represents the trend. In the late 1970s, there were high electricity 
price increases due to the electricity demands previously mentioned (Storer & Teljuer, 





























































































































































of the 90s due to the recommendations of the De Villiers Commission. During this 
period, households and firms were relatively price inelastic to minor increases in the 
electricity price (Gigler & McMillan, 2018:1). In 2011, Inglesi-Lotz and Blignaut 
conducted a panel data study where they found that between 1993 and 2006, South 
Africa’s industrial sector had a statistically significant negative price elasticity of 
demand of -0.869 to historical electricity price increases (Gigler & McMillan, 2018:3).  
Table 2.4 (on the next page) takes a closer look at the historical average electricity 
price increases per year from 2004 to 2017. 
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Table 2.4: Historical average price increases: 2004 – 2017 
 Year 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 
Local-
authorities 
-0.36% 6.22% 4.62% 7.90% 27.89% 32.38% 28.17% 21.51% 13.68% 11.13% 8.66% 12.42% 9.80% 
Residential 5.80% 3.56% 4.14% 6.76% 19.88% 19.76% 3.86% 16.64% 12.31% 6.17% 6.11% 10.26% 9.70% 
Commercial 6.14% 3.68% 3.58% 5.75% 27.20% 29.60% 28.45% 21.45% 14.59% 12.86% 7.86% 12.23% 9.02% 
Industrial -1.31% 4.75% 9.40% 7.93% 25.49% 24.66% 27.02% 16.83% 13.56% 13.67% 9.71% 10.25% 8.10% 
Mining 1.95% 5.35% 4.41% 6.47% 28.49% 30.84% 31.50% 20.93% 15.88% 16.00% 7.52% 12.22% 8.70% 
Agriculture 5.79% 6.58% 2.52% 6.61% 27.47% 28.80% 23.33% 19.94% 14.37% 9.02% 6.36% 10.83% 10.54% 
Traction 2.06% 4.55% 3.93% 10.75% 27.75% 28.36% 27.01% 15.83% 22.08% 12.65% 8.13% 15.50% 8.64% 
International 9.71% 13.95% 13.41% 27.05% 30.28% 21.76% 38.14% 18.32% 16.33% 11.32% 10.49% 13.84% 18.31% 
Internal 19.76% 




0.05% 6.01% 6.18% 8.52% 27.40% 27.96% 32.08% 19.13% 16.35% 7.39% 7.67% 11.46% 8.48% 
Source: Eskom (2018), NERSA (2018)
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Table 2.4 above shows the historical average electricity price increases per category 
of users. According to Blom (2018), the correct price of electricity today would be 
40c/KWh, instead of the official tariff of R1,09. Consumers on prepaid electricity pay 
even more, at R4,54/KWh.  
2.4.4 From democracy to energy restructuring  
Given the historical injustices of the apartheid regime, many previously disadvantaged 
persons were not connected to the electricity grid. Therefore, one of the socio-
economic objectives of the new government was to electrify as many homes as 
possible. Eskom was the main vehicle through which this was achieved because of it 
being owned by the state. 
In 1994, South Africa became a democratic country. However, the electrification of 
more households had already begun prior to this. According to Eskom (2019), in 1993 
there were 300 000 electrifications countrywide, where two thirds were done by Eskom 
and the other third by municipalities. This process has been formally encapsulated in 
the Department of Energy’s (DME) (2014) Integrated National Electrification 
Programme (INEP). According to the DME, access to electricity was at only 36% in 
1994, and it increased to 88% in 1994. The highest number of electrifications done 
during this period were in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo.  
An important policy, called the Energy White Paper, was drafted in 1998 (DME 1998). 
Its overarching goal was to restructure the energy sector in South Africa, given some 
challenges which had been identified in the sector. These challenges were that 
although there was excess electricity supply capacity at the time, growth in electricity 
demand was projected to exceed generation capacity by 2007 (White Paper, 1998). 
The distribution of electricity by municipalities still had challenges of mass defaults, 
theft of cables, and as a result, increasing arrears. Another challenge was that coal-
based generation had been identified as a large carbon emitter, which had long-term 
adverse effects on the environment.  
In her study, Van der Heijden (2013) noted that the White Paper envisaged 
Independent Power Producers (IPP) being introduced into the power sector, together 
with the restructuring of Eskom into generation and transmission companies. This was 
a key opportunity for enhancing Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and private 
investment. In addition, the government intended to encourage competition by also 
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giving the IPPs access to the transmission infrastructure. In response to this, Eskom 
closed its New Works department in 2001, a department which was responsible for 
generation capacity at the utility. Eskom took this action because of government’s 
anticipated electricity supply from the IPPs (Van der Heijden, 2013). It is critical to note 
that this was another erroneous action by the government. They allowed Eskom to 
stop any further building of generation plants before ensuring that IPPs would come 
on board.  
As is commonly known, an increase in market competition often involves some degree 
of privatisation, which often results in job losses. In 2001, the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) was successful in opposing the partial privatisation 
component of the Eskom Conversion Act, No.13 of 2001, because IPPs were said to 
be the new custodians of electricity supply. Their main argument was the protection of 
thousands of jobs at Eskom.  
Figure 2.4 below is a graphical illustration of the staff numbers at Eskom from 1985 to 
2017. 
 
Figure 2.4: Eskom staff numbers from 1985-2017 (thousands) 
Source: Eskom Financial Statements (1985-2017) 
Eskom is the SOE with the largest number of employees. As can be seen from Figure 
2.4, the general trend of employment at Eskom is downward, especially from 1985 to 

















































































































































became the chairman of the Electricity Council in 1985. When he assumed his position 
there were 66 000 staff members, and management had projected that to increase to 
72 000 in 1986. Maree believed that Eskom could function with less staff and by the 
end of 1986, he had reduced the staff complement to 60 800. By the early 1990s, he 
had reduced Eskom’s staff numbers to 50 000 (Eskom, 2018).  
Given this data on employment at Eskom, it can be inferred that there has generally 
been a limited production of output as a result of the low staff numbers between 1990 
and 2012, at 50 000 and 43 473 respectively (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). From 2005, 
employment started to pick up owing to the significant measures the corporation 
undertook towards skills development. This occurred in the form of learnerships, 
bursaries and general technical training. In 2005, Eskom had 1 568 bursary-holders 
and trainees, 85% of which were black and 55% women (Eskom Annual Report, 
2005:93). Yet this increase in recruitment has not assisted in pushing the building 
programme forward.  
2.5 FINANCIAL CRISES AT ESKOM  
This section discusses financial crises at Eskom in terms of the Eskom building 
programme and load shedding. 
2.5.1 Eskom building programme 
Between 2001 and 2004, IPPs failed to come to the market, and the government 
started to instruct Eskom to build its own generation capacity, after it had closed its 
New Works department some three years before. This would mark the beginning of 
Eskom’s financial crises, including load shedding. Eskom’s building programme 
started in 2005, and has still not been completed to date, despite constant requests 
for funds from the government. To date, the programme has cost R213,2 billion, 
excluding capitalised borrowing costs (Eskom, 2018).  
The building programme started with the Medupi power station and a part of Kusile. 
Over the years, Eskom has started new projects that include pumped storage, a wind 
farm, and a general strengthening of the grid.  
Since 2008, Eskom’s management has been heavily frowned upon by business and 
citizens alike due to the electricity blackouts that started in 2007. The public perception 
of Eskom has worsened over the years. This is not only because of the blackouts but 
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the incredulous scale of access to funds which Eskom has been given, with the state 
acting as a guarantor of its debt (Liu et al., 2017). Eskom has had access to equity 
injections, government loans and the capital market. According to the DBSA (2012), 
Eskom has had accessed to even more types of funds through the African 
Development Bank, export credit agencies, commercial paper and other resources.  
In 2008, the then Minister of Public Enterprises, Alec Erwin announced a R60 billion 
equity injection into Eskom, after NERSA’s approval of Eskom’s tariff increase at that 
time (IOL, 2008:1). The R60 billion was approved to enable Eskom to recover its 
primary energy costs over a five-year period. This means that the government injected 
cash or capital into Eskom’s balance sheet in order to make the utility more attractive 
for more access to credit. When the media asked the Minister whether this injection 
would contribute to Eskom’s building programme, he was evasive and stated that there 
was no clear indication of what this injection would be used for and that it was merely 
shareholder support (IOL, 2008:1).  
One has to stop at this point to ask, can Eskom be held entirely responsible for this 
situation? The short answer is certainly not. Eskom were informed that their generation 
capacity would no longer be needed, which led to them closing down their New Works 
department, which had to be consequently reopened after about four years.  
However, this is not to say Eskom is totally exempt from any accountability regarding 
its building programme. Eskom’s access to funds from capital markets also meant they 
received R12,25 billion for the issuance of global bonds in 2010 (Creamer, 2011:1). 
So this begs the question why all these funds are not sufficient to complete a building 
programme that started 15 years ago. Unfortunately, the oversubscription of Eskom’s 
bonds has attracted even closer monitoring and scrutiny from credit rating agencies. 
This is because many international investors have taken on the risk associated with 
Eskom’s bonds. Furthermore, the utility’s constant financial crises, as well as fraud 
and corruption cases, only attract heavier credit scrutiny.  
In his study of Chinese SOEs, Cheng (2004) found that SOE managers enriched 
themselves by abusing their power. In the same vein, Nguyen and Van Dijk (2012) 
also found that corruption in Vietnamese SOEs is rife and has a negative effect on 
economic growth. It is only through upgrades, such as the one by Moody’s on 5 April 
2018, that the utility’s global reputation manages to stay afloat (Moody’s, 2018:1). 
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2.5.2 Load shedding  
Eskom’s poor service quality is characterised by power outages which started from 
2007, were at their peak from 2008 to 2010, but slowly improved thereafter. Several 
claims from the media attested to coal quality and low reserve margins as the major 
drivers of load shedding.  
The most significant price increases occurred during 2008 and 2010, a period during 
which the country experienced a significant number of load shedding disruptions. 
Fraud and corruption cases, as well as cash injections from the state, were also at 
their peak during this period. 
Load shedding had a significantly adverse impact on businesses and productivity 
during this period. Evidence of this is found from Gigler and McMillan’s (2018:5) study 
where they calculated the net present values of energy-intensive and moderately 
energy-intensive firms’ operating profit. Although their focus was more on firms in the 
mining industry in which electricity is a large production input, their study extrapolated 
data until 2041. They found that the largest declines in operating profit were from the 
most energy-intensive firms, namely, Evraz Highveld Steel (17,1%), Implats (14,1%), 
and PPC (12,4%) when extrapolated in a high-tariff scenario (Gigler & McMillan, 
2018:5).  
From 2008, there has been a significant increase in electricity prices. According to 
economic theory, an efficient price is one which is equal to marginal cost (Pindyck & 
Rubinfeld, 2013). This is not the case, since Eskom is a monopoly that is able to 
manipulate the electricity price. Since 2008, Eskom has been making frequent 
applications for tariff increases which they started to justify as necessary to avoid 
power outages. According to Altman (2008:2), Eskom’s proposed price increases 
enable unnecessarily fast repayments of loan finance and exceed what is required to 
maintain credibility with its creditors.  
However, one can also consider the fact that the price increases may be necessary to 
contribute to maintaining Eskom’s property, plant and equipment as well as its other 




2.6 ESKOM’S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
Global financial accounting and reporting provides important tools to assess a 
company’s financial standing. The most important tools for such an assessment are 
the annual financial statements which all commercial companies produce annually. 
Annual statements comprise of the following items: the income statement; the balance 
sheet; notes to accounts; statement of cash flows; the audit report and the statement 
of changes to equity (Walton & Earts, 2009:5).  
While all the above-mentioned items are important, the study will focus on the income 
statement, balance sheet and notes to accounts. The income statement is the main 
performance indicator of profitability, while the balance sheet gives a picture of how 
the company has been financed, and how that money has been invested in productive 
capacity (Walton & Earts, 2009:4).  
While it is useful to have financial statement data in whole numbers, there needs to be 
a more uniform measure to compare and understand all data on the same standard. 
One of the uniform standards is financial ratio analysis (Walton & Earts, 2009:238). 
According to Kumbirai and Webb (2010), financial ratio analysis is effective in 
distinguishing high performing companies and those that are not performing well. 
There are several ratios, such as management performance ratios that include 
profitability ratios and asset utilisation ratios. There are also financial strength ratios 
that include long-term solvency risk ratios and short-term liquidity risk ratios.  
The study will use the aforementioned financial strength ratios, in particular, the debt-
to-assets ratio and the current ratio:  
• A current ratio measures the ability of a company to pay off its short-term debt 
without disturbing normal operations (Walton & Earts, 2009:247). It is calculated 
as current assets divided by current liabilities.  
• The debt-to-assets ratio is a solvency ratio and is an indicator of stability and risk 
(Odalo, 2016). It essentially calculates how much of the business is owned by the 
company and how much of it is financed by debt. It is calculated as total liabilities 
divided by total assets.  
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As with all commercial companies, Eskom’s financial statements are the best 
determinant of financial performance because trends, calculations and inferences can 
be made from these.  
2.6.1 Eskom’s current ratio 
Figure 2.5 below is a graphical illustration of Eskom’s current ratio for the period 1985 
to 2017. 
 
Figure 2.5: Eskom’s current ratio: 1985-2017 
Source: Eskom Financial Statements (1985-2017) 
Figure 2.5 above shows Eskom’s current ratio between 1985 and 2017. A low current 
ratio of less than 1 indicates that a company will not be able to pay off its short-term 
obligations, even if it can liquidate all its current assets (Odalo, 2016). However, a high 
current ratio of greater than 1,5 implies that the company is highly liquid, which means 
that it would be able to pay off its short-term obligations by selling its current assets at 
a high value (Odalo, 2016).  
The upward trend of Eskom’s current ratio does not mean it is generally moving 
towards a strong range of liquidity. Throughout the sample period, Eskom has been 
relatively illiquid, and never obtaining a current ratio that is greater than 1.5. Eskom 
was most illiquid during 1985 with a current ratio of 0,44, well below the number 1 
mark. Its subsequent troughs were in 1991 (0,88), 1994 (0,76), 1996 (0,76), 2008 














































































































































While these ratios show the financial position at Eskom as being weak, it is noteworthy 
that this was during the times were electricity prices were generally flat. Therefore, the 
lack of increases in price could have negatively impacted its financial position. During 
2008 and 2017, the highest current ratios were in 2010 (1,4) and 2015 (1,2). While 
these aforementioned ratios show positive information about the utility’s financial 
position, it must be borne in mind that this was the period in which Eskom had the R60 
billion equity injection from the state through NERSA’s tariff increase approval in 2008.  
The R60 billion mentioned above was approved for Eskom to recover its primary 
energy costs over a five-year period. Eskom’s access to funds from capital markets 
meant they received R12,25 billion for the issuance of global bonds in 2010, which 
also had the effect of improving Eskom’s current ratio (Creamer, 2011). Therefore, the 
current ratio can be affected by many financial developments.  
2.6.2 Eskom’s debt-to-assets ratio 
Figure 2.6 below shows Eskom’s debt-to-assets ratio from 1985 to 2017. 
 
Figure 2.6: Eskom’s debt-to-assets ratio: 1985-2017 
Source: Eskom Financial Statements (1985-2017) 
A high debt-to-assets ratio implies that there is a high risk for financial distress since 
there is high financial leveraging (Odalo, 2016). A debt to asset ratio of less than 30% 
or 0.3 is desirable, while a ratio higher than this shows that the company’s leverage is 


















































































































































The general state of Eskom is one of financial distress. As a result, the data only 
confirm the details in the financial statements. Even though the debt-to-assets ratio 
trend has been generally downwards from 1985 to 2017, it has still been on average, 
above 30%. Throughout the entire period, the debt-to-assets ratio has been at a 
minimum of 60%, with its highest being close to 100% between 1987 and 1996. There 
was a significant decrease in the debt-to-assets ratio between 1997 and 2003, with a 
peak at 2005, a trough at 2006, and a peak again in 2008 which sparked another 
upward trend. Overall, Eskom uses debt financing for its operations because they are 
so close to a debt-to-assets ratio of 100%.  
Eskom has also been facing a majority of negative working capital from 1985 to 2017 
(Eskom Financial Statements; 1985 - 2017). This implies that if they were not an SOE, 
they would soon declare bankruptcy or insolvency. So, given the fact that they are 
backed by the state guaranteed loans, lax credit monitoring and soft budget 
constraints, the debt-to-assets ratio almost has no relevance. Nevertheless, it is 
important for this study to illustrate how much of a burden Eskom is on the fiscus.  
In conclusion, it needs to be mentioned that  
2.7 ESKOM’S DEBT  
Figure 2.7 below provides a graphical illustration of Eskom’s debt from 1985 to 2017. 
 
Figure 2.7: Eskom debt (R millions) 














































































































































Eskom Debt (R millions)
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Figure 2.7 above shows that throughout the sample period, Eskom’s debt has 
increased sharply from R20,747 million in 1985 to R534,067 million in 2017. For 
example, the figure shows that the debt in 1985 was only 3,88% of the debt in 2017. 
Eskom’s debt was significantly lower in 2014 at R185,414 million, but thereafter 
increased to R441,269 million in 2015.  
Another factor to consider and that influences the graph in the figure above, is that the 
R60 billion loan injected into Eskom in 2008 was also a response to credit downgrades. 
Initially, R30.5 billion of this loan was classified as equity, and the remaining R29.5 as 
loan liability. On 31 May 2015, the loan portion was also converted to equity under the 
Eskom Special Appropriation Bill and Eskom’s Subordinated Loan Special 
Appropriation Amendment Bill (Government Gazette, 2015). This conversion of the 
loan was also another effort to appease credit rating agencies, while also freeing up 
Eskom’s borrowing capacity. Nevertheless, this form of state guarantee is the 
paramount reason for Eskom’s mounting debt and Figure 2.7 shows that this debt will 
continue to increase.  
2.8 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
It is evident that the financial health of Eskom is a significant determinant of its financial 
performance. However, another managerial strategy that can assist is to implement 
appropriate corporate governance measures. Corporate governance refers to the 
systems and structures by which firms are controlled (Lipczynski et al., 2013:121). 
Challenges to these systems and structures arise because of a conflict of interest 
between the principal and the agent regarding the maximisation of company value. 
This conflict of interest is mitigated through various systems, such as a board of 
directors, dividend policy, executive compensation, share ownership and market 
competition for products and services (Lipczynski et al., 2013:127). 
The fact that there is a high turnover amongst the board of directors at Eskom is one 
indication of a compromised corporate governance system. In their study of Chief 
Executive Officer’s (CEO’s) compensation and the performance of SOEs in South 
Africa, Ngwenya and Khumalo (2012) note that there is a negative relationship 
between CEO compensation and SOE performance. They also found that in 2011, the 
salaries of Eskom’s executives increased by 109%. This is surely a large contributor 
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to Eskom’s debt, as these salaries could be revised down and the surplus invested 
into working capital, assets or even paying off some its interest-bearing debt.  
According to Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) (2015:31), the SOEs of the future 
need to have the following four properties in order to enhance corporate governance. 
These properties are 1) active ownership and 2) management by government, but with 
3) a clear mission and vision, as well as 4) transparency and accountability. These 
properties should be internally managed with efficient processes and services; and 
should be a strategic playground for growth and development.  
In a study of corporate governance in SOEs in Southern Africa, Balbuena (2014) has 
the same a similar view to PWC, and she details six sub-sections to corporate 
governance which she views as challenges in SADC countries (South Africa, 
Swaziland, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Mauritius).  
They are as follows (Balbuena, 2014): 
1. The legal and regulatory framework;  
2. The role of the state acting as an owner;  
3. The treatment of non-government shareholders and private participation in SOEs; 
4. Relations with stakeholders, corporate ethics and anti-corruption;  
5. Transparency, accountability and disclosure; and  
6. SOE board practices.  
2.9 PRIVATISATION: LESSONS FROM INTERNATIONAL UTILITIES 
Privatisation has always been viewed as the best alternative to state ownership. This 
is because privatisation primarily reduces borrowing costs to the government. While 
SOEs are indeed a burden on the state, this section shows that full privatisation may 
not be the best solution. Therefore, the ownership and management of an SOE should 
be carefully thought out in order to avert the pitfalls such as job losses and increases 
in the electricity price, which occurred with the gas and electricity privatisation in the 
UK (Section 2.9.1) and the California electricity crisis in the USA (Section 2.9.2).  
2.9.1 Gas and electricity privatisation in the UK 
From 1948 until 1990, the UK had a monopoly supplier of electricity called the Central 
Electricity Generating Board (CEGB). It consisted of the generation and transmission 
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division with 12 area boards, locally known as municipalities, responsible for 
distribution (Newberry & Pollit, 1997). This structure is similar to that of Eskom. The 
UK’s power industry also has a regulator, which is the Office of Gas and Electricity 
Markets (Ofgem) under the Gas Act of (1986), Electricity Act of (1998) and Utilities Act 
of (2000).  
The way in which the market now works is through a power pool. Companies that 
generate electricity sell to the pool, while suppliers buy from it. However, the 
generation companies were soon abusing their market power by charging high prices 
to the pool, by making low-cost generation plants available and claiming they need 
emergency maintenance, hence the high prices (Varian, 2010; Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 
2013).  
In the 1980s, privatisation was a big policy instrument in the UK. Those years were 
also called ‘Thatcher era’, where the UK even had initial public offerings (IPOs) for the 
British Airways, Rolls-Royce, British Airports, as well as companies in the steel and 
water industries (Lypczinski et al., 2013:708-709). The electricity industry was later 
privatised in 1989.  
According to Bacon (1995), the key reason for privatisation was the belief that the 
market is more efficient. However, and perhaps a more realistic reason is that the 
government did not want the responsibility of subsidising SOEs. Another reason was 
the large receipts the state would receive from the private sector which would improve 
the UK’s borrowing requirement (Bacon, 1995).  
There were many positive effects of the reform, such as an increase in labour 
productivity, increased competition in the industry, consumers being able to choose 
their own suppliers, and substituting away from coal to gas, which is a ‘cleaner’ 
technology (Newberry & Pollit, 1997). However, there were also negative effects in 
that there was a great amount of job shedding, with 250 000 workers in the mining 
industry losing their jobs owing to the substitution away from coal towards gas. Another 
disadvantage of privatisation was that the private suppliers were charging exorbitant 
electricity prices.  
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2.9.2 California electricity crisis in the USA 
The California electricity crisis occurred in 2001. For nearly a century, California’s 
electricity industry was organised around three regulated private vertically integrated 
monopolies, namely, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE) 
and San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG &E) (Joskow, 2001:366). It is of great 
pertinence to recognise the length of time which these monopolies had been in 
operation and the fact that they were regulated. These are the characteristics of 
Eskom. The only difference is that in California, the regulatory responsibility was split 
between two entities, the first being the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), 
which regulates electricity prices, and other terms and conditions of retail service 
(Joskow, 2001:367). The second regulator was the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC), which was responsible for regulating the terms and conditions 
of the selling of power between utilities and the sales of unbundled transmission 
service required to support wholesale power transactions (Joskow, 2001).  
After pressure from industrial customers to reduce electricity prices, the CPUC initiated 
a comprehensive review of the structure and performance of the California electricity 
supply industry in 1993. By April 1994, the CPUC released a report called the ‘Blue 
Book’, which was a radical reform programme. It is particularly intriguing that concerns 
about high prices led the CPUC to a complete reform, as opposed to perhaps 
smoothing electricity price increases over time. This course of action could have been 
easily attainable through extensive calculations by the regulators.  
The reform programme was a disaster, as prices rose by 500% between the second 
half of 1999 and the second half of 2000 (Joskow, 2001). This speaks volumes about 
introducing elements of full reform, such as privatisation and the introduction of 
competition, in a monopolised market. One reason for the crisis was allowing the 
market to determine prices. At moderate and low demand periods, electricity prices 
were relatively close to marginal costs. However, when demand was high, it was clear 
that the market was clearing at prices far above the marginal cost of the most 
expensive generators in the region (Varian, 2010).  
In addition to the already bleak picture, PG&E and SCE both became insolvent in 
January 2001, and stopped paying their power bills and other financial commitments 
(Joskow, 2001). This is because wholesale power prices rose dramatically, while retail 
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prices remain fixed and so the utilities were going at a loss. Eventually, the State of 
California had to step in and was forced to use state funds to purchase power from 
unregulated wholesale suppliers to avoid widespread blackouts (Joskow, 2001). To 
avoid further losses as a state, retail price increases of between 30 – 40% went into 
effect in June 2001 and it is likely that this will remain the case for quite a long time 
(Joskow, 2001).  
2.10 CONCLUSION 
An important conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that government intervention 
can be detrimental to SOEs’ operations and eventual financial stability. During 
apartheid, the biggest error that the government made in 1984 was to recommend that 
Eskom should not charge cost-reflective tariffs. This resulted in flat electricity tariffs 
across the 1990s, but bearing in mind that Eskom was operating with substantial debt. 
Another error made by the state in the democratic era was in the restructuring of the 
energy sector. The Energy White Paper issued in 1998 resulted in Eskom closing its 
generation building department in 2001 because they were informed that new 
electricity supply would come from the private sector. 
This is by and large the reason why the government has had to channel significant 
amounts of money into Eskom’s balance sheet through equity injections, state-
guaranteed loans, and receipts from the global issuance of Eskom bonds. This is 
because the financial crisis at Eskom has been a long time coming from 1984. In both 
eras of Eskom’s operations, the background shows that government should have a 
restricted role in the operations of an SOE, regardless of its share as the majority 
shareholder.  
However, corporate governance issues cannot be ignored. Corruption at Eskom 
continues to make an already unstable SOE into a further financially crippled entity. 
This is where corporate governance plays a critical role, and where the appointment 
of board of directors should be far more independent. As for the challenge of Eskom 
continuing to be a fiscal risk, the National Treasury needs to consider fiscal 
consolidation as one of the ways to resolve the entity’s debt challenge. Otherwise, it 
has to consider privatisation. 
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However, privatisation of the electricity industry in the UK and USA provides some 
lessons for Eskom. The main positive effects of privatisation are increased competition 
in the industry, a broader consumer choice of suppliers, and switching to more 
environmentally friendly generation (gas in the UK). But more importantly, the negative 
effects were job losses, mainly for the UK coal mining industry as well as high 
electricity prices in both countries.  
Given all the sections contained in this chapter, it is up to the state to choose the way 
forward for Eskom, but the background and literature show that fiscal consolidation is 
effective, while full privatisation of the electricity industry can be detrimental to 




THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter is critical in order to highlight the theoretical foundation of the study’s 
empirical analysis. The study seeks to investigate the relationship between 
government debt and the financial performance of Eskom, and as such, is a macro – 
micro model. To the author’s best knowledge, studies in economics on this relationship 
are very scant. Hence, there is difficulty in locating a specific economic theory which 
applies to the variables contained in the empirical models. As a result, several theories 
are used to justify the variables in this study.   
Section 3.2 presents a theoretical discussion of the dependent variable, namely, 
government debt, by using the Keynesian theory of government debt, while Section 
3.3 will discuss the corresponding empirical literature. Section 3.4 presents a 
discussion of the theoretical literature that explains the financial variables chosen as 
independent variables for the current study.  
The theoretical literature is comprised of the neoclassical theory of the firm, the 
Modigliani and Miller paradigm, agency theory, stakeholder theory and the new 
institutional economics approach.  
Section 3.5 discusses the positive and adverse effects of the financial performance of 
a state-owned enterprise. Section 3.6 unpacks the empirical literature that is related 
to an SOEs’ financial performance. Section 3.7 concludes by reiterating that the 
current study has used several theories to test the relationship between government 
debt and the financial performance of Eskom.  
3.2 THEORETICAL LITERATURE: GOVERNMENT DEBT 
According to Buchanan (2008:1), “government debt is a legal obligation on the part of 
a government to make interest and/ or amortisation payments to holders of designated 
claims in accordance with a defined temporal schedule”. Ward (1987:1) also makes 
mention of the fact that it is the difference between the total receipts of central 
government, local authorities, and public enterprises, considered in aggregate and 
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their total expenditure. One could also add that government debt is the accumulation 
of every year’s budget deficit. 
This section discusses the various aspects that are relevant to government debt and 
that are relevant to the current study. 
3.2.1 Purpose of government debt 
Keynes (1936) believed that the accumulation of government debt should only be used 
for public capital expenditure and to stabilise the economy as a form of decreasing 
unemployment. In the same vein, Tanzi (2016) supports this argument by noting that 
Keynes proposed that public borrowing should also have a short life span, since its 
primary use is to stabilise the economy in the short-term. Therefore, Keynes did not 
advocate for government debt to be used for government consumption or transfers, 
be they for social spending or even public entities. This narrative resonates with 
Svaljek (1997) who argues that government borrowing should not be used for 
balancing current accounts, inflation control, the growth of private investments, or even 
maintaining credibility as a state.  
3.2.2 Approaches to government debt 
There are mainly two approaches to government debt, namely, the normative 
approach and the positive approach. The sub-sections below will discuss these two 
general approaches to government debt. 
3.2.2.1 Normative approach to government debt 
The normative approach can be associated with the neoclassical school of thought. 
The main idea behind this approach is that the state is a benevolent social planner, 
and its only function is to provide greater flexibility for the government in the 
intertemporal balancing of government debt revenues and expenditures (Barro & Grilli, 
1994). Barro’s (1979) theory of the neutrality of debt is the underlying foundation of 
this approach. Neck and Getzner (2001) also call this theory the Barro’s tax smoothing 
model or the equilibrium approach to fiscal policy.  
Barro (1979) uses the Ricardian equivalence theorem to show that expansionary fiscal 
policy does not have an effect on aggregate demand. He claims that this theory holds 
because of his notion of tax smoothing or constant tax rates. This means that when 
the government increases its expenditure through debt financing, individuals have 
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myopic foresight, anticipate this budgetary change and act accordingly. For instance, 
if the government decreases taxes by borrowing, individuals will anticipate higher 
taxes in the future and so will not engage in any consumption spending. This implies 
that there will be no effect on aggregate demand, interest rates, wealth, or even capital 
formation (Svaljek, 1997).  
Other economists, such as Stiglitz (2015), have even viewed government spending as 
a growth factor because they believe large and sustained fiscal injections are justified 
when the growth rate falls below what they believe should be the long-term trend.  
On the contrary, Brauninger (2005) actually notes that there is a negative relationship 
between government debt and economic growth. Mncube and Broxvia (2015) use the 
debt-stabilising primary balance framework in supporting Stiglitz (2015) because they 
view debt management as a tool for enhancing economic growth and growth 
enhancing investments. This means that they also use the balanced budget approach 
to government debt, where deficits are always undesirable because they crowd out 
private investment; hence, the need for stimulus packages when the growth rate is 
below the perceived potential growth rate. It could also be said that the balanced 
budget approach views stimulus packages as necessary when the government 
experiences budget deficits.  
3.2.2.2 Positive approach to government debt 
Over the past few decades, there has been a growing trend of government debt 
accumulation, despite the fact that many governments do not need to borrow (Tanzi, 
2017). 
The accumulation of government debt is attractive because unlike taxes, it requires 
little coercion, no administration, and is readily available to repay over an extremely 
long period of time. However, evidence from Buchanan (2008), Tanzi (2016) and 
Hyman (2011) suggests that the burden of public debt is shifted to future generations 
in the form of higher taxes which will be used to pay the interest on the current 
accumulated debt. Thus, the study refutes the Ricardian equivalence theorem and 
Barro’s (1979) tax smoothing model. This is because in reality, every economic action 
of an individual, business or government, has an effect on the economy.  
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Government debt is a dependent variable in this study to show that the neutrality of 
debt does not hold. Economic theory supports the stance of the study through Keynes’ 
aggregate demand model as illustrated in Figure 3.1 below.  
 
Figure 3.1: Aggregate Demand-Aggregate Supply Model (AD-AS model) 
Source: Adapted from Snowdon & Vane (2005), Blanchard & Johnson (2014) 
Keynes Demand Function:  
AD= Consumption + Investment + Government Spending + (Exports – Imports) 
Y = C + I + G + (X-M)…………………………………………………….…….………. (3.1) 
GDP = C + I + G + (X-M)………………………………………………….…….……... (3.2) 
Figure 3.1 above shows the AD-AS model. Its assumption is that all variables are fixed, 
except government spending. Therefore, all else being equal, the raising of 
government debt can be used to increase government spending.  
Initially, the economy is at equilibrium point E, at output level Y, and price level P. An 
increase in government spending will cause the aggregate demand curve to shift 
outward to the right, from  𝐴𝐷 to 𝐴𝐷′. This puts the economy at the new equilibrium 
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point 𝐸′, and output increases from point 𝑌 to 𝑌1 while the price level also increases 
from point 𝑃 to 𝑃1 (Blanchard & Johnson, 2014).  
This shows that government borrowing does indeed have an effect on aggregate 
demand and inflation, which is the general increase in the price level. An increase in 
aggregate demand requires more labour. As workers are employed and earn an 
income, they spend part of it and save the other. This contributes to wealth and 
consumption. Therefore, using this model, the study refutes the normative approach 
to government debt.  
3.2.3 Effects of government debt 
This section discusses the effects of government debt in terms of the positive and 
negative effects of government debt, and deficit financing. 
3.2.3.1 Positive effects of government debt 
If the borrowing described in the previous section is invested in capital expenditure, 
there will be an increase in output by firms (Peston, 1987:1). Owing to a higher level 
of production, firms will employ more labour, and this will increase the aggregate 
income in the economy (Perry, 1987:1). Owing to Keynes’ multiplier effect, when the 
newly employed labour spend some of their income, there is a further increase in 
aggregate demand, although not by the same proportion. This causes the demand 
curve to shift further out from 𝐴𝐷′ prime to 𝐴𝐷′′.  
This effect on aggregate demand supports the study by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) 
who assert that debt accumulation can serve as a way of redistributing income over 
time and across generations. This redistribution of income can reduce the deadweight 
loss associated with taxes which come from the provision of public goods and 
services. 
3.2.3.2 Adverse effects of government debt 
When it comes to the effects of government debt on the price level, Keynes’ assertion 
that borrowing should only be used for capital expenditure, or as a stabilisation policy, 
becomes apparent (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). An increase in government spending 
creates inflationary pressures on the economy. This eats away at consumers’ 
purchasing power which, ceteris parabus, can lead to lower economic growth because 
of a decrease in consumption (Blanchard, 2014). Therefore, this is one of the reasons 
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why Keynes emphasised that borrowing should never be used for transfers or general 
government consumption, because over time the inflationary pressures undermine the 
objective of the initial increase in government spending.   
The effects of expansionary fiscal policy are certainly positive for economic growth, 
output and employment. However, too much borrowing to expand government 
spending has adverse effects. This is because there is a tendency for the state to 
spend more than it receives. This is mostly because of high levels of social spending 
that states engage in and at some point, and that causes government spending to 
outstrip its revenue (Hyman, 2011; Black et al., 2015). In such instances, the 
government usually engages in activities of deficit financing. 
3.2.3.3 Deficit financing 
The main way in which deficit financing or functional finance occurs is by borrowing 
from credit markets. The government does this by increasing its demand for loanable 
funds. This increase in the supply of loanable funds causes the interest rate to 
increase, which decreases the quantity of loanable funds available (Parkin et al., 
2012:530). In addition, this is detrimental to households and firms who would want to 
acquire any form of durable goods because the interest rate on the respective loanable 
funds would be too high (Hyman, 2011:500).  
The effect of debt financing is what is known as the debt burden. This is the 
redistributive effect of debt financing (Hyman, 2011:515). Debt financing causes a 
decrease in the level of investment because of the higher interest rates on loanable 
funds. This has the capacity to increase unemployment, since the decrease in the 
volume of investment implies less output and less need for labour (Hyman, 2011:499).  
Although debt financing implies lower tax in the current period, in future there will be 
an increase in future taxes that are needed to cover the interest payments of the 
accumulated debt. This shifts the debt burden to future generations who will have 
lower standards of living most probably owing to higher inflation as well.   
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3.3 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE: GOVERNMENT DEBT 
Wheeler (1999) conducted a study on the macroeconomic impacts of government debt 
in the USA during the 1980s and 1990s. This was of particular interest because the 
USA had amassed a large proportion of government debt at the time. The study was 
conducted through the use of a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model to derive variance 
decompositions and impulse response functions.  
Wheeler’s (1999) study tested the Barrow’s REH (1979) by examining the impact of 
government debt on output, price levels and interest rates. He used the following 
variables in his model: exogenous elements of fiscal policy (G), is federal debt (D), 
money stock measured as a real variable (M2), industrial production (Y), and the 
consumer index, P (Harris, 1995; Lütkepohl, 2006; Lütkepohl & Poskitt, 1991). He 
found that the Ricardian equivalence is at odds with his results, since government debt 
proved to have a negative impact on macroeconomic activity.  
The scholars, Sunge, Mufandaedza and Matsvai (2015) found that the REH does not 
hold for Zimbabwe for the period from 1980 to 2013. The variables used in their study 
were private consumption, GDP, government expenditure, tax revenue, total 
government debt and interest payments. They determined this by using an Error 
Correction Model (ECM) in an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing 
approach. Using the same methodology, Osodiuru, Odo, Ugwuoke and Chikwendu 
(2018) also conducted a study to test the REH in Nigeria from 1986 to 2015. They 
found that a long run relationship does exist between private consumption and GDP, 
government expenditure, tax revenue, total government debt and interest payments. 
Hayo and Neumier (2016) used a logit model to find the validity of the REH. They did 
this by conducting a representative sample survey of 2,000 participants in Germany. 
They were asked whether they made significant changes to their consumption and 
behaviour patterns after an increase in government debt for the period from 2008 to 
2012. In general, they found that the equivalence theory does not hold. However, there 
are a significant number of scholars who have found empirical support for the 
Ricardian equivalence. Other studies which supported the REH, using the VAR model, 
during the 1980s and 1990s include those by Dwyer (1982), Plosser (1982), Fackler 
and McMillin (1989), and Darrat (1989, 1990).  
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There are also recent studies which support the REH. Mosikari and Eita (2017) tested 
the theory in the Kingdom of Lesotho for two sample periods, namely, 1980 to 2014 
and 1988 to 2014, using the ARDL cointegration approach. In this approach they 
tested the relationship between household consumption, government debt, 
government expenditure, GDP per capita, population growth and inflation. They found 
that the REH holds for Lesotho’s economy, thus fiscal policy is an ineffective tool to 
stabilise the economy.  
Similarly, Nkalu, Richardson and Nwosu (2016) also conducted a test of the REH in 
Ghana and Nigeria during the period from 1970 to 2013. They used the Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions method and Two-Stage Least Squares. They established a 
long run cointegrating relationship between interest rates, government expenditure, 
budget deficit, money supply and inflation. Unlike the finding of Osodiuru et al. (2018), 
they concluded that the REH holds in Ghana and Nigeria.  
Magazzino (2017) tested the REH using a VAR model in a panel study of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) countries for the period 1980 to 2013. He used this model to test 
the relationship between the trade balance and government budget. His study was 
ambiguous, since he found that the hypothesis doesn’t hold for 10 countries out of the 
31 economies which make up the ASEAN and APEC.  
This empirical literature review has argued that although many studies support the 
REH, government debt generally has adverse effects on macroeconomic activity. Most 
of the studies used the following variables: government debt, GDP, government 
expenditure, tax revenue, consumption, output, money stock, interest rates and 
inflation.  
However, studies by Wheeler (1999), Hayo and Neumier (2016), Sunge et al. (2015), 
as well as Osodiuru et al. (2018), support this study in its assertion that debt financing 
and general government debt are detrimental to the average citizen. This is because 
the citizen is the one who faces high interest rates after government’s debt financing 
decreases the supply of loanable funds. The citizen also has to repay the debt in the 
form of increased future taxes. All of these factors lead to poor living standards for 
current and future generations. Table 3.1 (on the next page) presents a summary of 
the empirical literature on government debt.  
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Table 3.1: Summary of empirical literature on government debt 
Study Sample Methodology Findings 
Wheeler (1999) United States; 1980 – 1995 VAR: Impulse Response Functions 
and Variance Decomposition 
Analysis 
The study refutes the REH  
Hayo & Neumier (2016)  Representative sample 
survey of 2,000 participants 
in Germany  
Logit model The survey found that no significant 
changes were made to participants’ 
consumption and behaviour patterns after 
an increase in government debt from 2008 
– 2012. The study refutes the REH 
Sunge, Mufandaedza & 
Matsvai (2015)  
Zimbabwe: 1980 – 2013 Error Correction Model in an 
autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) bounds testing approach 
The study refutes the REH 
Osodiuru et al. (2018) Nigeria :1986 – 2015 Error Correction Model in an 
autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) bounds testing approach 
The study refutes the REH 
Dwyer (1982), Plosser 
(1982), Fackler & McMillin 
(1989), Darrat (1989, 1990). 
United States: 1980 – 1990 VAR: Impulse Response Functions 
and Variance Decomposition 
Analysis 
The studies support the REH 
Mosikari & Eita (2017)  Kingdom of Lesotho: 1980–
2014 and 1988–2014 
ARDL cointegration approach The study supports the REH 
Nkalu, Richardson & Nwosu 
(2016)  
Ghana and Nigeria: 1970 – 
2013 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
and Two-Stage Least Squares 
method 
The study supports the REH 
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Study Sample Methodology Findings 
Magazzino (2017)  ASEAN and APEC: 1980 - 
2013 
VAR model in a panel study The results are ambiguous, the study 
found that REH does not hold for 10 
countries out of the 31 economies which 
make up the ASEAN and APEC 
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3.4 THEORETICAL LITERATURE:  FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF 
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 
According to Broer (2012), despite recent progress, equations which describe 
business behaviour are still a shortcoming in macroeconomic models. As such, this 
study is unique in that it draws from several theories as foundations of its empirical 
models. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 have discussed the theoretical and empirical literature 
on the dependent variable, which is government debt. Sections 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 will 
discuss the theoretical and empirical literature related to the independent variables in 
the study. These variables are associated with the financial performance of Eskom 
and they are Eskom’s revenue, the electricity price, Eskom’s staff numbers, its current 
ratio, as well as its debt-to-assets ratio.  
3.4.1 Neoclassical theory of the firm 
While Eskom may be a state-owned enterprise, it is a firm first. Thus, it is important to 
consider the neoclassical theory of the firm as the first point of reference. This is 
because the theory of the firm contains the basics of how firms carry out their 
production decisions.  
Capital and labour are often used as the basic inputs into production, and so they are 
a measure of productivity. The measures of efficiency and profitability used in the 
theory include, but are not limited to, the price and revenue. The study uses these two 
measures of productivity as two of its independent variables.  




Figure 3.2: Microeconomics production function 
Source: Snowdon & Vane (2005)  
Where: 
Y = output 
K = capital 
L = labour 
Figure 3.2 above is a production function of a typical firm which shows the different 
combinations of input needed to produce output. In this case, = 𝐴𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿) , where A is 
technology which is assumed to be fixed because innovation occurs over long periods 
of time. Therefore, the only two inputs to production considered in this figure, are K 
which is capital and L which is labour. If output is initially at point 𝑎, where output is at 
𝑌0 and labour at 𝐿0 , an increase in staff numbers, from 𝐿0 to 𝐿1, increases output from 
𝑌0 to 𝑌1 (Snowdon & Vane, 2005).  
The current study uses staff numbers as a measure of productivity at Eskom. This is 
due to the fact that Eskom’s working capital was found to be negative when calculated 
for the entire sample period 1985 - 2017. However, in theory, the impact of an increase 
in capital will have the same effect on output. The production function shifts upward 
from 𝑌 to 𝑌∗ when there is technological change. 
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Central to the narrative of the theory of the firm is the notion of efficiency (Pindyck & 
Rubinfeld, 2013:610). Economic theory makes a distinction between two types of 
efficiencies, namely, technical and allocative:  
• With technical efficiency, the focus is on the least-cost solution for a given output, 
where price is equal to the marginal cost: = 𝑀𝐶 , and marginal revenue is equal 
to marginal cost (𝑀𝑅 = 𝑀𝐶) (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2013:612).  
• Allocative efficiency, however, requires both technical efficiency and a focus on 
the socially desirable output.  
A firm produces a socially desirable output when resources are used over a particular 
time period in such a way as to make it impossible to improve the well-being of one 
person without reducing the wellbeing of another. 
According to Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2013), the following are the conditions of a 
perfect market: 
• Firms are not able to make abnormal profits or revenue because they charge the 
price that is equal to the cost of producing an extra unit of a good. By implication 
there is no exploitation of consumers.  
• Firms in perfect markets become price-takers, which means that they take the 
price as given, owing to the large competition from many other firms (Pindyck & 
Rubinfeld, 2013:280).  
• There is free entry and exit in the market, and usually, product homogeneity. As 
such, there is no information asymmetry (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). 
• The price reflects perfect information about the cost of production, markets are 
complete, prices are uniform, and known to both buyers and sellers across all 
markets, and all markets automatically adjust in the short term.  
3.4.1.1 The monopoly 
A monopoly is a firm which has dominance in the market, and which is also known as 
concentration (Lipczynski et al., 2003). Eskom is one such firm, since it owns the 
generation, transmission and distribution across the country, sharing only a small 
percentage of the distribution of electricity with municipalities (Eberhard, 2004).  
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As such, monopolies are generally able to abuse their dominance by producing less, 
while charging a higher price for a given output. According to Varian (2010), the 
following scenarios are associated with a monopoly:  
• Firms are able to make abnormal profits and higher revenue than firms in perfect 
competition; 
• Monopolies are able to set their own prices since they are not affected by any 
competition; 
• There are high barriers to entry since monopolies are usually able to afford 
expensive means of production and have already captured the market; and 
• A monopolist’s price is not cost-reflective since there could be a high mark-up on 
cost as a result of its abuse of dominance. 
Figure 3.3 below illustrates the long run output decision of a monopoly. 
 
Figure 3.3: Long run output decision of a monopoly 
Source: Varian (2010) 
Figure 3.3 above displays the aforementioned characteristics of a monopoly, where:  
P = price 
LMC = Long run marginal cost 
LAC = Long run average cost 
MR = Marginal revenue 
AR = Average revenue 
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The AR curve is also the market demand curve. If a monopolist produces at Q, they 
produce at a price P, which is higher than the long run marginal cost curve. As such, 
a monopolist makes abnormal profits as their price of a unit is greater than its marginal 
cost (Varian, 2010).  
3.4.1.2 Regulation of monopolies 
As previously stated, utility industries often have regulators, and the National 
Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) is the regulator of the power sector in South Africa. 
The most pertinent duty of a regulator is to investigate any unfair practices by firms. 
Unfair practices include barriers to entry, abnormal profits and prices that are not cost-
reflective (Varian, 2010).  
It is important to emphasise that the most significant violation of monopolies to 
competitive practices is the rent-seeking approach to its price. This is a challenge, 
since efficient pricing is critical to any industry’s competitive structure and overall 
fairness to consumers (Briceño-Garmendia & Shkaratan, 2011).  
Other mandates of a regulator include assessments of whether power producers’ 
prices are efficient or not, and whether consumers derive social benefit from their 
electricity purchases (Alexander & Harris, 2005). 
Monopolies are aware that they have market power, and consumers are forced to 
subscribe to their product, even when it is not equitable to do so. As such, the 
regulation of a monopoly that is a state-owned enterprise has to be even stricter, as 
their purpose is not only profit but also social equity (Black et al., 2015).  
Regulators are also important to address firms’ costs which may be unintentional. 
Coase (1960) has identified the problem of social cost which can occur with a firm’s 
production decisions. The social costs associated with coal-generated electricity 
include negative externalities, such as pollution and carbon emissions.  
As of 31 July 2003, South Africa became one of the countries which adhere to the 
Kyoto Protocol, which is an international treaty that extends the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (Department of Energy, 2019). The main 
aim is the reduction of carbon emissions amongst the country members. Public finance 
literature suggests four ways in which this can be achieved, namely, through corrective 
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taxes, emissions standards, control and command policies, as well as the trading of 
pollution rights amongst emitting firms (Hyman, 2014).  
However, it is important to note that, while these methods may be effective in trying to 
curb the effects of carbon emission, there are also adverse effects. Firstly, South Africa 
is well endowed with coal, and so this is a competitive advantage in electricity 
generation. Also, Pereira Freitas and Pereira da Silva (2013) have found a strongly 
significant dynamic passthrough of carbon prices into electricity prices. In their study, 
they considered the Portuguese electricity system which includes gas and coal. 
Therefore, NERSA has to consider the aforementioned factors in its regulation 
practices. 
3.4.2 Risk Management Theory 
According to Pritchard (2014), risk is inherent in any business decision, hence risk 
management is an important strategy for any organisation, whether private or public. 
It is the failure of companies to manage risk that results in their poor performance, and 
as such, Eskom is no different.  
The literature contains examples of both financial and economic theories which relate 
to the financial risk management of a company. For the purposes of the current study, 
the Modigliani and Miller paradigm, agency theory, stakeholder theory and new 
institutional economics will be discussed in the sub-sections below.  
3.4.2.1 Modigliani – Miller paradigm 
Central to corporate risk management is the Modigliani – Miller paradigm, which posits 
the notion that the value of a firm is independent of its financial structure (Modigliani & 
Miller, 1958). According to this paradigm, as long as a company is hedging, its 
corporate risk management enables it to have a higher debt capacity (Modigliani & 
Miller 1958); lower expected costs of bankruptcy (Smith & Stulz 1985); comparative 
advantage in terms of information asymmetries, as well as a greater ability to secure 
internal financing (Geczy, Minton & Schrand, 1997).  
Of the few scholars that have investigated the Modigliani and Miller (1958) paradigm, 
Faff and Nguyen (2002), Graham and Rogers (2002), as well as Guay (1999), found 
that hedging enables higher debt capacity. Eskom debt is one of the independent 
variables in the study. The variable is of great interest, since Eskom’s debt has a direct 
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relationship with that of government’s. Guay (1999) and Geczy et al. (1997) verified 
that hedging results in an increase in internal financing, while Faff and Nguyen (2002), 
as well as Mian (1996) refuted this.  
There is a plethora of financial literature that analyses the financial performance of 
different types of firms, such as SOEs, private firms and mixed enterprises. Tian and 
Estrin (2007) conducted a study on Chinese publicly listed companies, specifically one 
in which government has a significant share ownership. They used an Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) and an Arellano-Bond General Method of Moments (GMM) regression. 
The study found that debt financing causes inefficiency in publicly listed Chinese 
companies. This conclusion was reached by way of modelling financial leverage ratios, 
managerial costs and the administrative costs of the company.   
The Modigliani Miller paradigm is highly impactful when it is applied to Eskom as a 
company only, and not as an SOE. Eskom’s hedging instruments include financial 
trading assets, insurance investments, derivatives held for risk management, and 
embedded derivatives (Eskom Annual Report 2019). The derivatives held for risk 
management are equal to R19,538 million, and yet their internal financing through debt 
securities and borrowings for 2019 are a mammoth R440,610 million. Since Eskom 
has high debt levels, it is important to assess its solvency and liquidity. This is why the 
current study chose the current ratio and debt-to-assets ratio as variables in the study.  
The Modigliani and Miller (1958) paradigm has presented a risk management theory 
which is the foundation of corporate finance. However it has also resulted in adverse 
effects on companies’ financial performance. This can be seen from the 
aforementioned financials at Eskom which are related to this paradigm.  
However, Tufano’s (1996) study found no evidence of the Modigliani and Miller 
paradigm (1958), and focuses more on managerial theories as an influence on 
corporate risk management theory. These managerial theories include the agency 
theory, stakeholder theory and the new institutional economics approach, as 
discussed below.   
3.4.2.2 Agency Theory 
The principal-agent relationship is a result of the modern firm’s separation of 
ownership and control between the shareholder and the manager (Lipczynski et al. 
2013). The agency theory is now the framework through which this relationship is 
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analysed. Agency costs to the company occur when there are information 
asymmetries between the shareholder and manager. Managers are prone to being 
self-interested and maximise their own utility at the expense of the company. Thus, 
managerial attitudes can have a significant impact on risk management (Smith & Stulz 
1985).  
In the case of an SOE, the majority shareholder of the company is the government, 
while senior management, such as the Chief Executive Officer, is the manager. 
Managers often take advantage of the fact that remuneration is not dependent on the 
organisation’s performance due to low pressure from the state (Lipczynski et al., 
2013). As a result, they do not engage in revenue or sales maximisation or even 
growth maximisation (Baumol, 1959; Lipczynski et al., 2013:92).  
As such, one of the independent variables of the study is Eskom revenue to investigate 
the role of the agency theory. The electricity price is closely tied to sales maximisation, 
which is another reason why it was included as an independent variable in this study.  
3.4.2.3 Stakeholder Theory 
One of the earliest works of Friedman (1984) is the stakeholder theory. It is a 
managerial theory that is centred around the organisation and the balancing of the 
interests of its various stakeholders. Friedman (2006) as well as Harrison and Wicks, 
(2013) calls stakeholders the groups of people without which the organisation would 
not exist. The main types of stakeholders include shareholders, customers and 
employees. Klimczak (2006) has found that stakeholders are highly sensitive to costs 
of financial distress and bankruptcy.  
The two stakeholders that are highly sensitive to the aforementioned costs at Eskom 
are the state and all other users of electricity. The state, because it has to constantly 
bail out the utility, and the users of electricity at the business and household level 
because of continual price increases.  
3.4.2.4 New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
Williamson (1998) is at the forefront of new institutional economics. This school of 
economic thought focuses on governance processes, and deduces that socio-
economic institutions are involved in guiding these processes. NIE predicts that 
financial performance may be determined by institutions or accepted practices within 
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a market or industry. Such practices include remuneration that is independent of 
performance, as well as constant increases in the electricity price.  
Although there are scant empirical studies related to NIE, it has a stronger element of 
corporate governance practices than practically managing financial performance.   
3.5 THEORETICAL LITERATURE ON FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE  
This section presents an evaluation of the theoretical literature regarding the positive 
and negative aspects of financial performance.  
3.5.1 Positive aspects of financial performance  
The Modigliani-Miller paradigm emphasises the importance of hedging in order to 
minimise risk, thereby encouraging companies to use their hedging as an indicator of 
company value. The positive aspect of this paradigm is that it is practical and can be 
easily implemented.  
According to the agency theory, information asymmetries result in miscommunication 
between the principal and agent. Thus the theory is helpful for companies to identify 
processes through the enhanced communication between the two agents. By doing 
so, the company implements an important strategy for increasing its company value.  
The stakeholder theory is useful because it has a high explanatory power in that it 
focuses specifically on the equilibrium of stakeholder interests as the main determinant 
of corporate policy. New institutional economics is instrumental in understanding risk 
management in SOEs because it emphasises how the theory focuses on governance 
processes. This is a strong driving factor around the financial crisis at Eskom, and has 
been for a long period of time.  
Ironically, when a monopoly is performing well or is profitable, it implies they are 
creating a social cost or deadweight loss in society (Hyman, 2011). This is because a 
monopoly is able to sell at a higher price for a lower quantity. This is the case with the 
purchase of electricity from Eskom, where a purchase of electricity can give you less 
than half of the rand value in kilowatts.  
3.5.2 Negative aspects of financial performance theoretical literature 
The Modigliani and Miller (MM) paradigm can have a detrimental impact on the 
company value in the long run. They encourage taking on high debt capacity, securing 
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internal financing, and using information asymmetry as a competitive advantage. This 
encourages managers to engage in risky financing and borrowing too heavily 
(Lipczynski et al., 2013:90).  
If Eskom were not the backbone of the economy, this theory would not be as 
detrimental to society. As with the adverse effects of government debt, Eskom’s debt 
and high internal financing have an equally negative impact on citizens. Internal 
financing refers to the ability of Eskom to gain access to funds. Their financial 
statements indicate that their internal financing includes state-guaranteed loans; 
commercial paper; export credit facilities and even funds from credit export agencies 
(Eskom Financial Statements, 2019; Thorne, 2018).  
Eskom’s debt affects the standard of living of South African citizens because a large 
proportion of their income has to be spent on electricity. The paradigm says a company 
that hedges can also have information asymmetry competitive advantage. This refers 
to the constant increases in electricity tariffs whose cost-pricing formula is not made 
public to ordinary citizens.  
However, not only do energy users have to bear the brunt of constantly increasing 
electricity tariffs, but they are also exposed to load shedding and blackouts. Gigler and 
McMillain (2018) found a significantly negative relationship between load shedding 
and productivity. Therefore, the most adverse effect of the Modigliani and Miller 
paradigm is its disregard for corporate governance and managerial discretion before 
taking on exceptionally high debt and securing internal finance.  
The other theories found in the literature do not have any negative aspects since they 
attempt to bolster efficient management practices.  
3.6 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE: FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
While the neoclassical theory of the firm is the cornerstone of economic theory, it is 
highly abstract and has not undergone many empirical tests (Estola, 2014). Similarly, 
in the field of corporate risk management, not many theories support the concept of 
financial performance through empirical analysis and data. Hence, many of the 
empirical studies in this section will measure financial performance from a practical 
accounting-based perspective.  
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Klimczak (2007) conducted a panel study of 150 non-financial Polish companies listed 
on the Warsaw Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2005. He conducted his study by using 
several methods, including Hotelling’s test (Mardia, 1975) for difference of vector 
means; ANOVA models, logit regressions, as well as Classification and Regression 
Trees (CART). In order to maintain comparability with previous studies, Klimczak 
(2007) decided to use a hedging proxy as the dependent variable to measure financial 
performance. This is in accordance with the Modigliani and Miller paradigm. Overall, 
Klimczak’s (2007) empirical results showed that although the Modigliani and Miller 
paradigm encourages high debt levels, from an agency perspective, an increase in 
gearing levels should only be done if there is low equity or low assets. 
The independent variables of interest in Klimczak’s study were sales (revenue), 
economies of scale, and government share in equity of greater than 5%. The two latter 
variables are useful to bolster the current study because economies of scale give a 
company a competitive advantage (Lypczinski et al., 2013). The share of equity which 
a government has in a company is also important in managing the principal-agent 
relationship which is founded on the agency theory (Smith & Stulz, 1985).  
Empirically, the new institutional economics approach found that the role of trends, 
ownership, and the industries in which companies find themselves have a significant 
influence on financial performance (Klimczak, 2007). Empirical results obtained from 
testing the stakeholder theory found that the Information Technology (IT) and services 
sectors showed more interest in risk management than SOEs or public companies did.  
Alshatti’s (2015) study is one of the first few theories which quantify the financial 
performance of a company by using credit utilisation ratios from financial statements. 
The study by Gurbuz, Aybars and Yesilyurt (2016) also used an accounting-based 
measure of financial performance, but theirs was through the use of EBITDA (earnings 
before interest tax, depreciation and amortisation). They used a panel data analysis 
of BRIC public firms between 2004 and 2013. The EBITDA was their dependent 
variable, and their independent variable was leverage, which is the debt-to-assets 
ratio.  
A study by Wang (2002) included return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) 
as dependent variables to measure financial performance. He did this in two separate 
OLS models of publicly listed firms on the Taiwan stock exchange during the period 
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from 2002 to 2007. A company’s return on assets is related to the debt-to-assets ratio, 
since it measures the profitability of a company’s assets. As such, the debt-to-assets 
ratio is of interest to the current study and has been included as an independent 
variable.  
Odalo (2016) identified liquidity, as measured by the current ratio, as an important 
determinant of financial performance, and it is another variable of interest to the 
current study. Company size, which is measured by staff numbers in the study, was 
also used as a variable of interest in Odalo’s (2016) study. Drawing from data found 
in financial statements, he conducted a study on the effect of liquidity and company 
size on the financial performance of listed agricultural companies listed on the Nairobi 
Security Exchange from 2003 to 2013. The study was conducted using a pooled OLS 
model. 
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This chapter discussed the theoretical and empirical literature related to government 
debt. The Keynesian theory on government debt asserts that government borrowing 
should not be used to support public entities. Barro’s (1979) Ricardian Equivalence 
Hypothesis (REH) was refuted by showing that government borrowing has adverse 
effects on the economy. The empirical literature on government debt showed a strong 
preference towards the REH, with scholars from different countries, using different 
methodologies but similar variables.   
The chapter also discussed the theoretical and empirical literature related to a 
company’s financial performance. The neoclassical theory of the firm was at the core 
of understanding the behaviour of a monopoly, while the Modigliani and Miller 
paradigm offered the premise of corporate risk management theory. The paradigm 
advocates for high debt levels as long as a company is hedging. The agency theory, 
stakeholder theory and new institutional economics approach were discussed as the 
managerial theories and strategies to bolster a company’s financial performance.  
The independent variables of the current study, namely, leverage, liquidity, revenue or 
sales, with the resultant price, showed to be significant determinants of financial 
performance. The company size, which can be a proxy for staff numbers, was also a 
determinant of a company’s financial performance. Overall, this chapter provided a 
theoretical foundation of how Eskom’s debt has an adverse effect on government debt, 






4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the estimation techniques which were used to 
generate the empirical results for this study. Section 4.2 starts by detailing the 
variables and the data sources. Section 4.3 presents a brief discussion of descriptive 
statistics, while Section 4.4 discusses the empirical techniques where stationarity and 
unit roots will be outlined. Section 4.5 outlines the estimation techniques of the VAR 
model, including Impulse Response Functions and Forecast Error Variance 
Decomposition Analysis. Section 4.6 discusses co-integration and the Error 
Correlation Model (ECM), using Engle and Granger’s two-step model. Section 4.7 
outlines the post-estimation diagnostic tests which were used on the ECM, while 
Section 4.8 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 DATA SOURCES  
Table 4.1 presents a list of the variables included in the current study and the sources 
of the data obtained for the study. 
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Table 4.1: List of variables 
Variable Description Measurement Source / Calculation 
Variables in 
Logarithms 
Government Debt (GD) Total gross loan debt: foreign bonds  ZAR million  Quantec Easy Data LGD 
Eskom Debt (ED) Eskom Debt: Non-Current Liabilities + 
Current Liabilities  
ZAR million Eskom Financial Statements 
(1985-2017) 
LED 
Revenue (REV) Income a business receives from the 
sale of goods and services to consumers 
ZAR million Eskom Financial Statements 
(1985-2017) 
LREV 
Electricity Price (EP) Historical average prices (cents per 
kilowatt) 
Cents/kilowatt Eskom Financial Statements 
(1985-2017), (NERSA:2017) 
LEP 
Staff numbers (STAFF) Number of staff (thousands) Thousands Eskom Financial Statements 
(1985-2017) 
LSTAFF 
Current Ratio (CR) Measure of short term liquidity: 
(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)/(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠) 
Ratio from 1.5 – 3  Eskom Financial Statements 




Measure of long-term solvency: 
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠)/(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) 
Ratio from 0-1 Eskom Financial Statements 
(1985-2017), Own calculations 
LDAO 
Gross Value Added 
(GVA) 
Gross value added at constant prices ZAR million South African Reserve Bank 





Gross domestic product at constant 
prices 
ZAR million Quantec, Easy Data LGDP 
Source: Authors compilations from Eskom Financial Statements (1985-2017), SARB (2019), Quantec (2019) 
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Table 4.1 above presents the list of variables to be included in both models, as well 
as their description, measurements, sources and logarithmic description. The sample 
size is from 1985 to 2017, which results in 33 observations.  
For Model 1, another variable was generated, namely, government debt/GDP which 
denotes the proportion of government debt relative to GDP. It is also commonly known 
as the debt-to-GDP ratio.   
For model 2, two variables have been generated, namely, Eskom debt/ government 
debt which represents Eskom’s debt as a proportion of government debt. The second 
variable is revenue/price, which is the revenue Eskom makes only because of 
increases in the price of electricity.  




= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛 𝐸𝐷𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐿𝑛𝐸𝑃𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐿𝑛𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑛𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑡+𝛽5𝐿𝑛 𝐶𝑅𝑡 +





= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1  
𝑅𝐸𝑉
𝐸𝑃𝑡
+  𝛽2 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑡+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑅𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑡 +   𝛽5𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑡 + 𝑡…..……….. (4.2) 
4.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS AND 
CORRELATION MATRIX 
In data analysis, descriptive statistics give useful information about a study’s variables. 
• The mean is a useful statistic because it tells you the average value of the 
particular variable over the entire sample period (Studenmund, 2014).  
• The median shows the middle value of the variable, while the maximum shows 
the highest value of the variable.  
• The Jarque-Bera (1980) statistic is a test for normality which analyses the 
statistical distribution of the variable by using kurtosis and skewness as part of its 
calculation.  
• A graphical analysis of variables in the form of a scatter plot or line graph is often 
a good visual indication of how a series behaves (Asteriou & Hall, 2016).  
• Lastly, a correlation matrix is a covariance analysis that indicates whether 
variables in the study have multi-collinearity (Gujarati, 2004). It is important as it 
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informs the researcher which variables to include in their study even before 
estimation 
4.3.1 Data generating processes, stationarity and unit root tests 
This section discusses the data-generating processes, stationarity and unit root tests.  
4.3.1.1 Data-generating processes 
Economists are guided by economic theory when modelling data, even though the 
specifics of that data-generating process may be unknown. However, economic theory 
does not provide any evidence about the processes of adjustment, exogenous 
variables, or even whether the variables to be included in the model are relevant 
(Hendry, Pagan & Sargan, 1984).  
Therefore, in trying to characterise the statistical process involved, the study starts 
with Harrison’s (1995) simple stationary univariate model over a time period of t=1 :  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜌𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡  where  I𝜌I < 1  
or 
(1 − 𝜌𝐿)𝑦𝑡 =  𝑢𝑡 ……...…………………………………………………….……….. (4.3) 
Where 𝐿 is the lag operator, such that  𝐿𝑦𝑡 =  𝑦𝑡−1  
This statistical model states that the variable 𝑦𝑡 is generated by its own past along with 
a residual term, 𝑢𝑡 (Harrison, 1995).  
An extended version of (4.3), is:  
𝑦𝑡 =  𝜌1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜌2𝑦𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝜌𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑢𝑡  ..…………..……………..... (4.4) 
This is known as a Markov autoregressive scheme or first order autoregressive 
scheme AR (1), where the 1 represents one lag. 
The following model represents a moving average process, in this case MA (1): 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝜇 + 𝑢𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡−1………..…..………………………………………………..…. (4.5) 
Equation 4.5 shows that the current dependent value of 𝑦𝑡  is a weighted average of 
previous and current values of the error term (Ergun & Goksu, 2013). 
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Equation (4.4) and (4.5) can be combined to become an ARMA model, in which the 
variable 𝑦𝑡  is generated by its own past, a residual term as a weighted average of 
previous and current values of the error term.   
4.3.1.2 Stationarity 
In time series, a stationary stochastic process is one in which the series is mean 
reverting and with no tendency to drift. For stationarity to hold, the stochastic error 
term 𝑡 of the particular time series must fulfil the following statistical properties:  
• Its expected value of the mean is equal to zero: 𝐸( 𝑡) = 0 
• Constant variance, which means there are no fluctuations around the mean: 
𝐸 ( 𝑡
2) =  𝜎2 
• It is uncorrelated with its past residual terms: 𝐸 ( 𝑡, 𝑡−1) = 0 
 
Conversely, a non-stationary stochastic process is considered to follow a random walk 
if the process has a constant mean, changing variance, and changing covariance over 
time. There are three types of random walk models, namely, 1) pure random walk, 2) 
random walk with drift, and 3) a random walk with drift and trend (Gujarati, 2004):  
 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 … ………………………………………………………… (4.6) 
(Pure random walk without drift = non-stationary) 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡…………………………………………………….. (4.7) 
(Random walk with drift = non – stationary) 
 𝑦𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡…………………………………………….... (4.8) 
(Random walk with drift and deterministic trend = non – stationary) 
 
Non-stationarity is a nuisance in time series modelling because it can create spurious 
regressions. Spurious regressions, a concept first discovered by Yule (1926), are also 
called nonsense regressions because they produce false significant statistical 
relationships. The random walk model is a simple case of a class of integrated 
processes (Gujarati, 2004).  
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Differencing non-stationary variables is an effective measure to convert them to 
stationarity and to change their order of integration, often denoted as I (d), where d is 
the number of times the series has been differenced. Since non-stationarity is 
extremely common, most variables are adequate for modelling after they have been 
differenced once, I(1) or even twice, I(2).  
The terms unit roots, non-stationary and random walk are synonymous. Therefore, 
when a series is non-stationary, one can also say it has a unit root. From equation 4.3, 
rho, (𝜌) in the AR(1) indicates the presence of a unit root. If the absolute value of  𝜌 is 
less than 1, the unit root process will forget its past errors and will have a constant 
mean, constant variance and constant covariance. However, if the absolute value of 
𝜌 is greater than or equal to 1, the series does not forget its past error and remains 
non-stationary, with a non-constant and non-finite mean, variance and covariance.  
4.3.1.3 Unit root tests 
Since the data-generating processes of the variables in this study are not known 
beforehand, unit root testing is an accurate method of detecting the presence of unit 
roots.  
There are six-unit root tests which have been established to deal with the problem of 
non-stationarity. They are the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) by Dickey and 
Fuller (1979), the Phillips-Perron (PP) test of Phillips and Perron (1988), and the 
detrended Augmented Dickey-Fuller test developed by Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock 
(1996). This is better known as the Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares (DFGLS) 
test. There is also the KPSS test by Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992), 
the Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock Point Optimal test (1996), and the Ng and Perron 
(2001) test.  
This study will only use only two unit root tests, the ADF and PP tests. Dickey and 
Fuller (1979) developed the ADF test, which was further expanded by Said and Dickey 
(1984) to detect the presence of non-stationarity. The only limitation of the test is that 
it can only be used in an Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model, 
provided that the lag length in the AR increases with the sample size. This is why 
Phillips and Perron (1988) formulated an alternative test for non-stationarity, where 
the data is not required to fit a certain statistical distribution in order for the test to be 
carried out. The Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares (DFGLS) test was also 
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considered as a third alternative to unit root testing but was not applicable for this study 
because it only gives accurate results for a sample size of 50 and above.  
The ADF test estimates the following regression (Gujarati, 2004):  
∆𝑦𝑡 =  𝛼0   +  γyt − 1 + 𝛼2𝑡  ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1  ∆𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑡…………………………... (4.9) 
Where 𝐻0 ∶ non-stationary, and 𝐻1: stationary 
Dolado, Jenkinson and Sosvilla-Rivero (1990) suggest equation 4.9 as the first model 
which should be estimated because it is the most generalised. This is because it 
contains 𝛼0 , which is the intercept term, as well as 𝛾 which is the deterministic trend.  
The other two models suggest a test without trend, and without trend and intercept.  
The choice of the three models is dependent on how a series behaves according to 
economic theory. The main advantage of the ADF test is its augmentation of the DF 
test. This augmentation overcomes the problem of higher order serial correlation in 
the model by including lagged variables on the right-hand side and the error terms 
converge closer to zero (Asteriou & Hall, 2016). Thereafter, the MacKinnon (1990) 
critical values embedded in the tests will give an indication of whether there is still the 
presence of a unit root.   
The Phillips-Perron (PP) test estimates the following model (Asteriou & Hall, 2016):  
Δ𝑦𝑡−1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑡 ….………………………………………..….. (4.10) 
Where 𝐻0 ∶ non-stationary, and 𝐻1: stationary 
The PP test is considered a more powerful unit root test if compared to the ADF test 
because it uses non-parametric statistical methods to correct the t-statistic. Since the 
PP’s t-statistic has the same asymptotic distribution as that of the ADF test, the 
MacKinnon (1990) critical values still apply to detect the presence of a unit root.  
4.4 VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE (VAR) MODEL  
In keeping with the discussion on data generating processes, AR processes can also 
be estimated to include a dynamic element to econometric analysis, and this is in the 
form of a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model (Lütkepohl, 2006). The VAR has 
become popular since the 1970s, owing to its ability to incorporate the rich dynamic 
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structure in time series data with the use of quarterly or monthly data (Lütkepohl, 
2006).   
This model of a VAR (p) specification is from Lütkepohl (2006):  
𝑦𝑡 =  𝑐 + ∅1𝑦𝑡−1 + ∅2𝑦𝑡−2 + ⋯ + ∅𝑝 𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑡  ………………………………… (4.11) 
Where 𝑦𝑡−1 represents a lag of 1 period up to 𝑦𝑡−𝑝, and c is a vector of constants (or 
intercepts). ∅1 represents the unknown parameter of the first lagged period up to ∅𝑝, 
while 𝑡  is a white noise error term which must fulfil the statistical properties 
associated with stationarity.   






























]    
𝑦𝑡  =   𝑐      +  ∅𝑗𝑌𝑡       +  𝑡 …………………………………………….………. (4.12) 
Where: 
𝑦𝑡= n x 1 column vector of observations of the dependent variable Y 
c = n x 1 column vector of intercept terms 
∅𝑗= n x n column vector of unknown parameters 
𝑡 = n x 1 column vector of error terms  
4.4.1 VAR lag length criteria 
An important aspect when estimating a VAR is its lag length. Ozcicek and McMillin 
(1999), Braun and Mittnik (1993) and Lütkepohl (1993) all emphasise that estimators 
of a VAR with different lag lengths give inconsistent impulse response functions and 
variance decompositions.  
The lag length is frequently chosen using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SIC), and the Hannan-Quinne Criterion (Ozcicek & McMillin, 
1999; Lütkepohl & Poskitt, 1991).  
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According to Gujarati (2004), the use of a high number of lags produces biased t-
statistics and reduces the degrees of freedom of a model.  
As such, the current study has chosen a lag length of 2 to avoid the aforementioned 
statistical challenges due to the small sample size of 33 observations.   
4.4.2 AR Roots graph/ table  
The AR Roots graph is a report of the inverse roots of the characteristic polynomial. 
From the AR(1) process in equation 4.3:  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜌𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 , for stationarity to hold the absolute value of  𝜌 is less than 1.  
This implies the inverse characteristic root, 1 𝜌⁄  should be greater than 1. However the 
AR roots graph shows the inverse roots of the characteristic polynomial which implies 
that the characteristic roots should lie within a unit circle of values between -1 and 1 
(Harris, 1995).  
The AR roots graph depicts these roots in the form of scatter plots within a unit circle, 
while the AR roots table depicts these roots in decimal form. Therefore the AR roots 
graph and table are tests of a VAR’s stability and stationarity.   
4.4.3 Impulse response functions (IRFs)  
An impulse response function can be represented as:  






∆2 + ⋯ ⋯ +
𝜕𝑦𝑡+𝑠
𝜕𝜀𝑛𝑡
∆𝑛 ……………………….… (4.13) 
Where, ∆ represents the amount by which a component changes and s represents 
some time period in future.  𝑡  represents the true shock to a variable within the 




However, the VAR is a simultaneous equation which means it has the problem of 
endogeneity (Gujarati, 2004).  
In the following primitive system of equations 4.14 and 4.15, 𝑦𝑡  and 𝑧𝑡  are 
endogenous.  
𝑦𝑡 +  𝑏12𝑧𝑡 =  𝑏10 +   𝛿11 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛿12 𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝑦𝑡……………………………… (4.14) 
𝑏21𝑦𝑡 + 𝑧𝑡 =  𝑏20 +    𝛿21 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛿22 𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝑧𝑡……………………………… (4.15) 
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Endogeneity implies that the bivariate system cannot be estimated because the 
regressors are correlated with the error term. However, restating the VAR in matrix 











































] = 𝑋 
𝐵𝑋𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑡 ……………………………………………………..…. (4.16) 
𝑋𝑡 =  𝐴0 +  𝐴1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡−1 ………………………………………………….…... (4.17) 
Where 𝐴0 =  𝐵
−1𝛾0;  𝐴1 = 𝐵
−1𝛾1; 𝑒𝑡 =  𝐵
−1
𝑡  , thus endogeneity is resolved and 
the new primitive system becomes equations 4.18 and 4.19:  
𝑦𝑡 =  𝑎10 +   𝑎11 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑎12 𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝑒1𝑡………………………………………… (4.18) 
𝑧𝑡 =  𝑎20 +   𝑎21 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑎22 𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑧𝑡………………………………………… (4.19) 
However, this system shows the residual error term 𝑒𝑡, and not 𝑡 which measures 
the true shock to the structural system. This implies that the VAR has the problem of 
identification.  
To resolve the problem, an important method of decomposing the residuals in a 






] =B, so 𝐵−1 =  [
1 −𝑏12
0 1
] when you let  𝑏21 = 0 ; 𝑒𝑡 =  𝐵
−1
𝑡 
through the triangulation method, 𝑒1𝑡 =  𝑦𝑡 − 𝑏12 𝑧𝑡 and 𝑒2𝑡 =  𝑧𝑡 
Once identification has been resolved, it is expected that after an initial shock or 
innovation to a variable, it will gradually converge to a mean of zero, which is the 
primary assumption of a time series with a normal distribution. 
4.4.4 Forecast Variance Decomposition Analysis  
Watson (1994) notes that forecast errors are an integral part of econometric analysis. 
This is because they assist with forecasting. An AR(1) can be used for forecasting 
where a variable is regressed on its lag. The weakness of this type of forecasting is 
that it only gives information on one previous time period and on one variable.  
In the following forecast errors:  
𝑦𝑇+𝑙 =  𝜇 + 𝜑 𝑇+𝑙 +  𝜑1 𝑇+𝑙−1 +  𝜑2 𝑇+𝑙−2 + ⋯ +  𝜑𝑙 𝑇 +  𝜑𝑙+1 𝑇−1 +  𝜑𝑙+2 𝑇−2 
…………………………………………………………………………………….….. (4.20) 
Where  𝑦𝑇+𝑙 is 𝐸(
𝑦𝑇+𝑙
𝐼𝑇∗
⁄ )  
T = is the current time period 
𝐼𝑇∗ = information at time T 
𝑙= time period in future 
𝜑 = represents the amount by which a shock changes  
Equation 4.20 shows the expected value or prediction of a variable which is conditional 
on the last known information about the variable at time T. The drawback of using 
simple forecast errors is that they are based on previous time periods.  
The VAR in equation 4.21, can be expressed as a vector moving average (VMA) in 




































In general, the n-step ahead forecast error is:  
?̅?+𝑛 = 𝛽 ?̅?+𝑛−1 + 𝛽
2 ?̅?+𝑛−2 +  ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ + 𝛽
𝑛−1 ?̅?+1.…………….………. (4.23) 
Where 
 ?̅?+𝑛  = forecast error, and the betas, 𝛽  are the parameters associated with each 
forecast error (Sims, 2011). 
If the focus is on 𝑦𝑡 , the n-step ahead forecast error is:  
𝑦𝑡+1 − 𝐸(𝑦𝑡+𝑛) = ∅11(0)
𝑠
𝑦,𝑡+𝑛 +  ∅11(1)
𝑠





𝑥,𝑡+𝑛 +    ∅12(1)
𝑠
𝑥,𝑡+𝑛−1 + ∅12(𝑛 − 1)
𝑠
𝑥,𝑡+1 …………….……………… (4.24) 
Where equation 4.24 shows the forecast error of a variable over 1 horizon. This follows 
from the assumption that shocks have a unit variance and are uncorrelated (Sims, 
2011).  
If the variance of the n-step ahead forecast error of  𝑦𝑡+𝑛 is denoted as 𝜎𝑦(𝑛)
2, then  
𝜎𝑦(𝑛)
2 =  𝜎𝑦
2[∅11(0)
2 + ∅11(1)








2 = variance of some time period n 
∅ = respective parameter in the VAR 
From equation 4.25 it is possible to decompose the n-step ahead forecast error 
variance due to each one of these shocks. The proportions of 𝜎𝑦(𝑛)
2 due to 𝑠𝑦,𝑡 
and 𝑠𝑥,𝑡  are:  
𝜎𝑦
2[∅11(0)
2 +  ∅11(1)





2 +  ∅12(1)
2 + ∅12(𝑛 − 1)
2]//𝜎𝑦(𝑛)
2…………………………….……. (4.27) 
The VAR is a strong analytical tool for forecasting because it forecasts using both the 
current period and time periods ahead.  
The forecast variance decomposition analysis method is also a stronger tool for 
forecasting because it presents the shocks to the variables in the model in percentage 
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form. In the simplest explanation, this tool analyses how much of a forecast error in 
one variable is explained by another.  
Both the IRFs and forecast error variance decomposition are influenced by a method 
called Cholesky Ordering (Harris, 1995; Lütkepohl, 2006; Lütkepohl & Poskitt, 1991), 
and is usually analysed over a horizon of 20 periods. Since the study’s sample size is 
short, 10 periods were chosen.  
This section has shown that the VAR is a strong model of estimation because it is able 
to overcome the problem of endogeneity. Another important aspect of the VAR is that 
it is able to overcome the identification problem found in simultaneous equations, and 
finally, it is relatively easy to estimate. 
4.5 COINTEGRATION 
Cointegration is a concept developed by various econometric theorists, including 
Granger (1981), Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (1995). Two or more series 
are cointegrated if they form a long run equilibrium relationship, even though they may 
be non-stationary (Harris, 1995).  
4.5.1 Cointegration tests 
There are two types of cointegration tests, namely, the Engle-Granger two-step model 
and the Johansen-Julius cointegration test.  
The Engle-Granger two-step model is a test for cointegration which is able to 
incorporate both the short run and long run dynamics of a cointegrated equation into 
its model. Engle and Granger (1987) also used this two-step procedure to construct 
an error correction model (ECM), which enables them to separate these short and long 
run components.  
The Johansen procedure is applied to estimate a Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM). A VECM is used to detect more than one cointegrating equation. However, 
as with the VAR, a VECM is highly parameterised and is more applicable to a large 
sample size. Hence, the study has chosen the Engle-Granger two-step model due to 
the small sample size of 33 observations.  
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4.5.1.1 Engle-Granger two-step model 
The following steps are used when testing for cointegration using the Engle-Granger 
two-step model (Harris, 1995; Gujarati, 2004): 
i) An estimation of the long run equation, where signs and magnitudes are noted; 
ii) The long run equation is evaluated according to the a priori signs and magnitudes 
expected, according to economic theory;  
iii) The long run equation is evaluated statistically, where a residual series is 
generated and p-values will be used to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration; 
iv) An ECM is constructed by including the cointegrating component, which is the 
lagged residual, which has to be negative and statistically significant;  
v) The ECM is evaluated where the residual coefficient must be negative and 
significant; the t-values must be significant, and the R-squared must be 
acceptable; and  
vi) The ECM should also be evaluated using post estimation diagnostic tests 
While these steps are the conventional method of constructing an ECM, a more robust 
test for cointegration can be applied after step three. This is the MacKinnon response 
surface testing which provides critical values for cointegrating tests (MacKinnon, 
1990). These critical values are powerful as they incorporate the dependencies of 
statistics’ quantiles on the number of variables in the ECM, the choice of the 
deterministic components and the sample size (Ericsson & MacKinnon, 2002).  
This is an important innovation in testing for cointegration because the residual series 
produced from the long run cointegrating equation in the E-Views software do not take 
the aforementioned concepts into consideration.   
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4.5.2 Engle-Granger error correction model 
According to Asteriou and Hall (2016), in the event that 𝑌𝑡  and 𝑋𝑡  are both non-
stationary I(1), the following regression will not give us adequate estimates of ?̂?1 and 
?̂?2 :  
𝑌𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡  ………………………………………………………….… (4.28) 
Once the two variables are differenced, they become ∆𝑌𝑡~𝐼(0) and ∆𝑋𝑡~𝐼(0) in the 
following regression model:  
∆𝑌𝑡 =  𝛼1 +  𝛼2∆𝑋𝑡 + ∆𝑢𝑡……………………………………………………….. (4.29) 
However, even though the problem of spurious regressions is resolved, equation 4.29 
only gives information about the short run relationship between 𝑌𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡. 
In economics, the main interest is the long run relationship between variables, and this 
is where the concept of cointegration and the ECM come into play.  
From equation 4.29, there is no longer spurious regression, and the new equation 
constructed from equation 4.28 becomes:  
𝑢?̂? =  𝑌𝑡 − ?̂?1 − ?̂?2𝑋𝑡…………………………………………...…………………. (4.30) 
From equations 4.28, 4.29 and 4.30, the following ECM can be constructed:  
∆𝑌𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝑏1∆𝑋𝑡 − 𝜋?̂?𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑡 ………………………………………………. (4.31) 
Where 𝑏1 = short run impact that measures the impact that 𝑋𝑡 will have on ∆𝑌𝑡 
𝜋  = speed of adjustment which shows to what extent the disequilibrium from the 
previous period is corrected in the current period, 𝑌𝑡 





















𝑖=0 +  ∑ 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑡−1
𝑚
𝑖=0  + ∑ 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑡−1
𝑚
𝑖=0  +  𝛿𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 +   𝑢𝑡 ….. (4.32)  
Where:  




𝛿  = speed of adjustment which shows to what extent the disequilibrium from the 
previous period is corrected in 𝑌𝑡 
𝑢𝑡 = contains the long run components of the model. 
According to Asteriou and Hall (2016), as well as Harris (1995), the main advantages 
of the ECM are: 
i) The model is relatively simple to construct; 
ii) Once stationarity has been achieved, the properties of Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) can be used to obtain consistent estimates of the cointegrating vector; 
iii) The model combines the short run components as well as the long run 
equilibrium; and 
iv) The ECM produces a coefficient which is the speed of adjustment to equilibrium. 
4.6 POST-ESTIMATION DIAGNOSTIC TESTS 
It is important to perform diagnostic tests, even after the ECM has been estimated, in 
order to investigate if it has tendencies which violate the classical OLS assumptions. 
The specific assumptions are that OLS estimates have a normal distribution, no serial 
or auto correlation, and no heteroskedasticity. Another critical assumption is that the 
model is correctly specified.  
The section below discusses some of the post-estimation diagnostic tests for the 
current study’s ECM. 
4.6.1 Jarque-Bera Test 
According to the central limit theorem, when a sample is large enough, the joint 
sampling distribution should follow a normal distribution. Jarque and Bera (1980) 
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formulated an equation which tests residuals for normality, where the null and 
alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
 𝐻0: Residuals are normally distributed. 
𝐻1: Residuals are not normally distributed. 
Its test statistic is calculated using the formula in equation 4.33: 








N= number of observations 
k = number of estimated parameters 
S = skewness of variable 
K = kurtosis of variable  
4.6.2 Ramsey RESET 
The Ramsey (1969) RESET test seeks to investigate the probability of misspecification 
in the regression model. It does so by calculating an F-statistic which has been 
obtained from a regression on the estimated values of the model.  
The F-statistic is calculated as follows:  




𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠
⁄  
(1−𝑅2𝑛𝑒𝑤)
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 ⁄
……………………………… (4.34) 
 
As a result, the Ramsey RESET test investigates the relationship between the 
estimated residuals and estimated regression model.  
4.6.3 Ljung-Box Q Test 
According to OLS assumptions, the residual error terms of different observations 
should not be correlated (Gujarati, 2004). The Ljung-Box Q statistic tests for 
autocorrelation in the residuals to detect the presence or absence of white noise. The 
null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:  
𝐻0: Residuals contain no autocorrelation up to any order k, residuals are white noise. 
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𝐻1: Residuals contain autocorrelation up to any order k, residuals are not white noise. 
Its test statistic is calculated using the formula in equation 4.35: 





𝑗=1 …………………………………………………..……… (4.35) 
Where 𝑄𝐿𝐵~𝑥
2 
T = number of observations 
K = the highest order of autocorrelation for which to test 
𝑟𝑗
2 = the j-th autocorrelation 
4.6.4 Breusch–Godfrey Test 
The Breusch–Godfrey Test is also a test for serial correlation. This test is similar to the 
Ljung Box Q statistic, however, it does so through an augmented residual regression 
(Gujarati, 2004). It can also be applied whether lagged dependent variables are 
included or not.  
The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows: 
𝐻0: No autocorrelation up to the p-th order. 
𝐻1: Autocorrelation exists up to the p-th order. 
Where  𝐿𝑀𝐵𝐺~𝑥
2 
From  𝑦𝑡 =  𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝑡, the augmented regression for testing autocorrelation up to the 
p-th order is: 
?̂? = ?̂?𝑋𝑡 + 𝛼1 ?̂?−1 + 𝛼2 ?̂?−2 + ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ + 𝛼𝑝 ?̂?−𝑝 + 𝜔𝑡……………………… (4.36) 
Where 
̂ = the estimated residuals used to estimate the augmented regression.  
?̂? = parameter of independent variable 
𝛼 = paramters of lagged estimated residuals 
𝜔𝑡 = residual error term 
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4.6.5 Engle’s Autoregressive Residuals Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
Lagrange Multiplier (ARCH LM) Test 
Heteroskedasticity among residual error terms is a violation of the classical OLS 
assumptions. It is an instance where the error term’s variance is not constant (Gujarati, 
2004). The skewness of the statistical distribution of the series can result in a non-
constant variance of the error term. Incorrect data transformation, such as incorrect 
differencing, could also give rise to heteroskedasticity. This test investigates the 
presence of inconsistent variance among the residuals.  
The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:  
𝐻0: No autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity up to order q. 
𝐻1: Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity exists up to order q.  
Where  𝐿𝑀𝐸~𝑥
2 
From 𝑦𝑡 =  𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝑡, the augmented regression for testing heteroskedasticity up to 
the q-th order is: 
?̂? = 𝛼1 ?̂?−1 + 𝛼2 ?̂?−2 + ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ + 𝛼𝑝 ?̂?−𝑝 + 𝜔𝑡……………………………… (4.37) 
Where: 
̂ = the estimated residuals used to estimate the augmented regression.  
𝛼 = paramters of lagged estimated residuals 
𝜔𝑡 = residual error term 
4.6.6 White’s Heteroskedasticity Test 
White’s Heteroskedasticity Test is another test for heteroskedasticity. According to 
White (1980), heteroskedasticity results in faulty inferences when testing statistical 
hypotheses. It is desirable that a model should be homoskedastic in order to guarantee 
the reliability of its estimates. The White’s test uses the following null and alternative 
hypotheses:  
𝐻0: No heteroskedasticity.  
𝐻1: Presence of heteroskedasticity exists.  
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From 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑡 + 𝑡 , the augmented regression is calculated as 
follows:   
2̂




𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑥𝑡𝑧𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡…………………. (4.38) 
Where: 
̂ = the estimated residuals used to estimate the augmented regression.  
𝛼1,2,3,4,5  = parameters of independent variables 𝑥𝑡  and 𝑧𝑡 ; squared parameters of 
independent variables and the parameter for cross terms, 𝑥𝑡𝑧𝑡 
𝜔𝑡 = residual error term 
4.7 CONCLUSION  
This chapter outlined the estimation techniques which will be used to generate the 
empirical results of this study. The chapter started by detailing the data sources, 
together with the description of the variables and model specifications. The unit root 
tests which would be used for the study, namely, the ADF test and Phillips-Perron test 
were also discussed.  
The estimation techniques of the VAR were also discussed, including the VAR lag 
length criteria, the AR roots table and graph, as well as other estimation techniques, 
such as impulse response functions and forecast variance decomposition analyses. 
The chapter also concluded that the VAR is a strong analytical model since it 
overcomes the problem of endogeneity and identification.  
The chapter also discussed the two-step Engle-Granger cointegration test, which is 
used to estimate the ECM. The discussion highlighted the fact that a small sample 
size can require a basic two-step Engle-Granger cointegration test, rather than the 
Johansen-Julius cointegration test. This is because the latter test is highly 
parametrised, and can result in a significant reduction in the degrees of freedom in a 
small sample, which can lead to biased statistics.  
The chapter also showed that once the ECM is constructed, post-diagnostic tests still 
have to be run. These tests are the Jarque-Bera test, Ramsey RESET Test, Ljung Box 
Q statistic, Breusch Godfrey test, ARCH LM test and White’s test.  
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Overall, the tests are conducted to make sure the ECM conforms to the assumptions 
of OLS, which include the normal distribution of residuals, correct specification, 






The purpose of this chapter is to provide the study’s empirical analysis. Section 5.2 
starts with a brief outline of the descriptive statistics and graphical analysis of all the 
variables. Section 5.3 tabulates and deliberates the results of the unit root testing 
performed on all the variables. Section 5.4 discusses the empirical results from the 
estimated VAR model, while Section 5.5 outlines the empirical results for the ECM. 
Section 5.6 conducts the Engle-Granger Cointegration Test, and Section 5.7 
constructs the ECM. Section 5.8 contains the post-diagnostic tests, and Section 5.9 
concludes the study. 
Table 5.1 (on the next page) presents the descriptive statistics of the study, while 
Figure 5.1 below it presents a graphical analysis of the variables relevant to the study 
which will be discussed in Section 5.2. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics 
 GD ED REV EP STAFF GDP CR DAR GVA 
 Mean  48846.00  116187.3  48272.48  23.41758  42496.06  1585178.  0.970566  0.816387  1404899. 
 Median  29492.00  44438.00  25029.00  13.76000  39952.00  1046144.  0.949930  0.820444  936503.0 
 Maximum  206778.0  534067.0  177136.0  81.77000  78119.00  4653579.  1.453054  0.951866  4090906. 
 Minimum  1185.000  20747.00  4625.000  4.120000  24289.00  131676.0  0.443368  0.609292  120568.0 
 Std. Dev.  56237.39  142081.0  50633.60  22.22232  11644.67  1388955.  0.241013  0.105448  1220460. 
 Skewness  1.316221  1.771141  1.366692  1.448267  1.054178  0.804363  0.369684 -0.331439  0.790418 
 Kurtosis  4.050690  4.990159  3.480018  3.717544  4.186013  2.352983  2.889707  2.051333  2.318364 
          
 Jarque-Bera  11.04634  22.69917  10.58999  12.24407  8.046214  4.134121  0.768392  1.841643  4.075044 
 Probability  0.003993  0.000012  0.005017  0.002194  0.017897  0.126557  0.680998  0.398192  0.130351 
          
 Sum  1611918.  3834182.  1592992.  772.7800  1402370.  52310862  32.02866  26.94079  46361653 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  1.01E+11  6.46E+11  8.20E+10  15802.60  4.34E+09  6.17E+13  1.858794  0.355815  4.77E+13 
          
 Observations  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33 
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Figure 5.1: Graphical analysis of variables 
Source: Author’s computation from E-Views 9    
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5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 
This section presents the descriptive statistics and graphical analysis of the study. 
5.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics in Table 5.1 offer interesting information about the study’s 
variables from 1985 to 2017. On average, government debt was R4 8846 million, while 
Eskom debt throughout the same period was R116, 187 million. The average 
electricity price has been 23,42 c/kW, where the cheapest electricity price throughout 
the sample period was 4,12 c/kW and the highest was 81,77 c/kW. The average 
revenue at Eskom is certainly high at R48, 272 million, with staff numbers being fairly 
consistent throughout the years at an average of 42, 496.  
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on average was R1, 404, 899 million, with its highest 
value being R4, 090, 906 million. According to ratio analysis, a company with a current 
ratio greater than 1.5 is in a good position to settle its short-term debt obligations over 
the next 12 months should it be liquidated (Odalo, 2016). On average, Eskom’s current 
ratio has been close to 1.5, however, Eskom’s lowest current ratio throughout the 
sample period was 0.44. This is an indication that Eskom is illiquid.  
The debt-to-assets ratio measures what proportion of the company’s assets is 
financed by debt (Yazdanfar & Öhman, 2014). A good debt-to-assets ratio is 
considered less than 0.4, which indicates low risk. However, Eskom’s debt-to-assets 
ratio has been well above 0.4 throughout the sample period, with an average ratio of 
0.82 and a maximum of 0.95. Lastly, as a result of increases in the electricity price, 
the revenue is on average at R1,837,12 million.  
The Jarque-Bera (1980) statistic indicates that GDP, current ratio, debt-to-assets ratio 
and gross value added (GVA) all have a normal distribution. 
5.2.2 Graphical analysis 
An informal method of detecting non stationarity is through graphical analysis. Figure 
5.1 shows that all the variables in the study are non-stationary at levels. The debt-to-
GDP ratio and government debt have a similar trend, while the debt-to-GDP ratio 
increases more than government debt from 1990. This after the lifting of the economic 
sanctions against South Africa and the release of Nelson Mandela from political 
87 
imprisonment (Calitz et al., 2011). As expected, the growth of GDP and GVA from 
1985 – 2017 show an increase that is associated with a time trend. The electricity price 
shows a steady decline from 1985 – 2000. This is as a result of the De Villiers 
Commission which instructed Eskom not to charge cost-reflective prices (Kantor, 
1988).  
While the electricity price increased slightly after the building programme in 2001, 
there was a sharp increase in the electricity price from 2008 onwards, which could 
have been attributed to the aversion of load shedding (Eskom, 2018). Eskom’s debt 
has also increased significantly from 2008. This is due to the increased access to 
funds through internal financing (Modigliani & Miller, 1958; Yazdanfar & Öhman, 
2014).  
Revenue at Eskom has steadily increased during the sample period, however, it has 
done so as a result of electricity price increases. This shows that the utility relies 
heavily on price increases, rather than sales. This is typical of a monopoly because 
they typical abuse their dominance in the market (Varian, 2010).  
The current ratio and debt-to-assets ratio are an indication of the company’s liquidity 
and solvency (Gurbuz et al., 2016; Odalo, 2016). Both ratios indicated that Eskom’s 
financial performance has been poor over the years (Klimczak, 2004). Staff numbers 
are an indicator of the productivity of a firm (Snowdon & Vane, 2005). Eskom’s staff 
numbers were steadily declining from 1985, and only started to increase from 2004.  
5.3 UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) was pioneered by Dickey and Fuller (1979). 
Phillips and Perron (1988) also went on to establish their own unit root test, the PP. 
The null hypothesis is non-stationary. If a test statistic is statistically significant, the 
null hypothesis is rejected, which suggests a stationary series. The Dickey-Fuller 
Generalized Least Squares (DFGLS) test was also considered as another 
comparative method for unit root testing. However, the test does not produce the most 
accurate results for a sample of less than 50 observations. Since the sample size of 
the study is 33 observations, it was best to exclude the DFGLS unit root test results.  
Table 5.2 (on the next page) presents the results of the unit root tests at levels. This 
is followed by Table 5.3 that presents the results of the unit root tests at first difference.  
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Table 5.2: Unit root tests at levels 
Variable Model ADF PP 
  
Lags α = 1% α = 5% α = 10% t-stat 
Band-
width 
α = 1% α = 5% α = 10% t-stat 
GD/GDP Trend & Intercept 7 -4.285 -3.563 -3.215 -2.669 4 -4.273 -3.556 -3.212 -1.563 
Intercept 7 -3.662 -2.960 -2.619 -2.576 4 -3.653 -2.957 -2.617 -1.423 
GD Trend & Intercept 1 -4.285 -3.563 -3.215 -2.943 4 -4.273 -3.557 -3.212 -1.938 
 Intercept 1 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -1.180 4 -3.653 -2.957 -2.617 -1.433 
GDP Trend & Intercept 0 -4.273 -3.558 -3.212 -1.493 1 -4.273 -3.556 -3.212 -1.468 
Intercept 0 -3.654 -2.957 -2.617 -7.608  0 -3.654 -2.957 -2.617 -7.608 
GVA Trend & Intercept 0 -4.273 -3.558 -3.212 1.502 1 -4.273 -3.558 -3.212 1.333 
 Intercept 0 -3.654 -2.957 -2.617 12.786 3 -3.654 -2.957 -2.617 9.453 
ED/GD Trend & Intercept 0 -4.273 -3.558 -3.212 -1.600 3 -4.273 -3.556 -3.212 -1.433 
Intercept 0 -3.653 -2.957 -2.617 -2.281 1 -3.654 -2.957 -2.617 -2.295 
ED Trend & Intercept 0 -4.273 -3.556 -3.212 -1.537 2 -4.273 -3.556 -3.212 -1.203 
Intercept 1 -3.662 -2.960 -2.61916 1.588 9 -3.654 -2.957 -2.617 2.001 
EP Trend &Intercept 1 -4.285 -3.563 -3.216 -2.094 4 -4.273 -3.558 -3.212 -1.172 
 Intercept 1 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 0.4681 3 -3.654 -2.957 -2.617 0.3201 
R/EP Trend & Intercept 0 -4.273 -3.558 -3.212 -2.606 2 -4.273 -3.558 -3.212 -2.480 
 Intercept 0 -3.654 -2.957 -2.617 -1.999 3 -3.654 -2.957 -2.617 -2.084 
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Variable Model ADF PP 
  
Lags α = 1% α = 5% α = 10% t-stat 
Band-
width 
α = 1% α = 5% α = 10% t-stat 
REV Trend & Intercept 0 -4.273 -3.557 -3.212 -1.700 3 -4.273 -3.558 -3.212 -2.018 
 Intercept 0 -3.654 -2.957 -2.617 -0.471 2 -3.654 -2.957 -2.617 -0.488 
STAFF Trend & Intercept 0 -4.273 -3.558 -3.212 0.764 4 -4.273 -3.558 -3.212 1.469 
 Intercept 0 -3.653 -2.957 -2.617 -0.681 3 -3.654 -2.957 -2.617 -1.024 
CR Trend & Intercept 0 -4.273 -3.558 -3.212 -3.090 1 -4.273 -3.558 -3.212 -3.004 
 Intercept 0 -3.654 -2.957 -2.617 -2.964 0 -3.654 -2.957 -2.617 -2.964 
DAR Trend & Intercept 0 -4.273 -3.558 -3.212 -4.154 1 -4.273 -3.558 -3.212 -4.144 
 Intercept 0 -3.653 -2.957 -2.617 -2.429 3 -3.654 -2.957 -2.617 -2.563 
Source: Author’s computation from E-Views 9, where: 
* Statistically significant at a 10% level 
** Statistically significant at a 5% level 
*** Statistically significant at a 1% level 
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Table 5.3: Unit root tests at first difference 
Variable Model ADF PP 
  
Lags α = 1% α = 5% α = 10% t-statistic 
Band-
width 
α = 1% α = 5% α = 10% t-statistic 
GD/GDP Trend & Intercept 1 -4.285 -3.563 -3.215 -5.546*** 4 -4.285 -3.563 -3.215 -5.616*** 
 Intercept 1 -3.662 -2.960 -2.619 -5.609*** 3 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -5.665*** 
GD Trend & Intercept 1 -4.285 -3.568 -3.218 -5.567*** 3 -4.285 -3.563 -3.215 -5.647*** 
 Intercept 1 -3.662 -2.961 -2.619 -5.628*** 4 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -5.691*** 
GDP Trend & Intercept 0 -4.284 -3.562 -3.215 -3.328* 2 -4.284 -3.563 -3.215 -3.337* 
 Intercept 0 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -3.465** 2 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -3.478** 
GVA Trend & Intercept 0 -4.284 -3.562 -3.215 -3.213* 0 -4.28 -3.562 -3.215 -3.213* 
 Intercept 0 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -3.354** 3 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -3.354** 
ED/GD Trend & Intercept 0 -4.284 -3.562 -3.215 -7.612*** 1 -4.284 -3.562 -3.215 -7.651*** 
 Intercept 0 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -6.621*** 3 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -6.537*** 
ED Trend & Intercept 0 -4.284 -3.562 -3.215 -8.206*** 8 -4.284 -3.562 -3.215 -10.920*** 
 Intercept 0 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -7.528*** 0 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -7.528*** 
EP Trend & Intercept 0 -4.284 -3.562 -3.215 -2.551 1 -4.284 -3.562 -3.215 -2.586 
 Intercept 0 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -2.378 2 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -2.509 
 None 0 -2.642 -1.952 -1.610 -1.942** 0 -2.642 -1.952 -1.610 -1.942** 
R/EP Trend & Intercept 0 -4.284 -3.562 -3.215 -8.083*** 7 -4.284 -3.562 -3.215 -14.819*** 
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Variable Model ADF PP 
  
Lags α = 1% α = 5% α = 10% t-statistic 
Band-
width 
α = 1% α = 5% α = 10% t-statistic 
 Intercept 0 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -7.819*** 2 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -7.919*** 
REV Trend & Intercept 0 -4.284 -3.562 -3.215 -5.042*** 1 -4.284 -3.562 -3.215 -5.034*** 
 Intercept 0 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -5.130*** 1 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -5.124*** 
STAFF Trend & Intercept 0 -4.284 -3.562 -3.215 -4.003*** 2 -4.284 -3.563 -3.215 -3.792** 
 Intercept 0 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -2.320 2 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -2.218 
CR Trend & Intercept 1 -4.296 -3.568 -3.218 -5.335*** 2 -4.285 -3.562 -3.215 -7.982*** 
 Intercept 1 -3.670 -2.964 -2.621 -5.181*** 0 -3.662 -2.960 -2.619 -7.531*** 
DAR Trend & Intercept 0 -4.285 -3.562 -3.215 -5.991*** 6 -4.285 -3.563 -3.215 -6.652*** 
 Intercept 0 -3.662 -2.960 -2.619 -6.15*** 6 -3.661 -2.960 -2.619 -6.962*** 
Source: Author’s computation from E-Views 9, where:  
* Statistically significant at a 10% level 
** Statistically significant at a 5% level 
*** Statistically significant at a 1% level 
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In Table 5.2, the unit root tests show that all variables are non-stationary at levels. In 
Table 5.3, the unit root tests show that all variables are stationary at first difference. 
The study decided to test stationarity using two models under the ADF and PP tests. 
These are the trend, as well as trend and intercept. This is because most variables 
have a trend, or a trend and intercept.  
5.4 VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION (VAR) MODEL RESULTS 
The following sub-section will present the results for the study’s VAR model. The 
section displays results for the VAR’s correlation matrix, AR roots graph and table. 
The section also discusses the impulse response functions and forecast error 
decomposition analysis. The model below is the study’s VAR: 
𝐺𝐷/𝐺𝐷𝑃 =  𝑓 (𝐸𝑃, 𝐸𝐷, 𝑅𝐸𝑉, 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐹𝐹, 𝐶𝑅, 𝐷𝐴𝑅)………………………………….….. (5.1) 
According to Mohr (2016), GDP is the total value of all final goods and services 
produced in a country. It is also an important measure of the performance of an 
economy from the demand or consumer side.  
The study has emphasised that SOEs are a contingent liability to the state because 
they increase government debt, usually in the form of state-guaranteed loans, and this 
has been the point of emphasis with Eskom. To capture the effect of Eskom’s debt on 
the economy as a whole, this model has included GDP as a variable, where it has 
been generated as government debt relative to GDP. This was done with the intention 
to highlight that government debt does have an effect on GDP, and it is often negative. 
Furthermore, this variable has been included in the model to show that Eskom’s debt 
as a proportion of government debt also has a negative effect on GDP.  
Table 5.4 below presents the VAR correlation matrix. This is a covariance analysis 
which indicates the presence of multicollinearity amongst the variables. When a 
variable is highly correlated with one or more variables in a model, it suggests that it 
can be linearly predicted with a high degree of accuracy.  However, the estimates of 
the model will be biased owing to the fact that one will not be able to completely isolate 
one estimate from another. Thus, a correlation matrix is important because it indicates 
which variables are suitable to be included in the model 
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Table 5.4: VAR correlation matrix 
Correlation 
Probability 
GD/GDP EP REV ED STAFF CR DAR 
























































Source: Author’s computation from E-Views 9, where: 
() indicates the p-values, and 
* Statistically significant at a 10% level 
** Statistically significant at a 5% level 
*** Statistically significant at a 1% level 
 
Table 5.4 shows the correlation matrix of the VAR model.  The p-values show the level 
of significance of the correlation between all the independent variables and their 
dependent variable (Steiger, 1980). 
The null hypothesis is that there is no correlation, but when the p-value is statistically 
significant at either a 10%, 5% or 1% level of significance, one can reject the null 
hypothesis in favour of the presence of correlation.  
According to the correlation matrix, all the variables have a significant correlation with 
the dependent variable, apart from staff, the current ratio, and the debt-to-assets ratio.  




5.4.1 VAR lag order selection criteria 
The Lag selection criteria indicate that two lags should be used to estimate the model. 
This is due to the fact that the sample size is small, at 33 observations, thus a large 
number of lags would decrease the degrees of freedom, thereby creating bias results.  
The most referenced criterion is the Akaike Information criterion (AIC) and the 
Schwartz information Criterion (SC) (MacKinnon, Haug & Michelis, 1999; Ozcicek & 
McMillin, 1999; Lütkepohl & Poskitt, 1991). 
5.4.2 Autoregressive (AR) roots graph & AR roots table 
Figure 5.2 below shows the inverse roots of autoregressive characteristic polynomial 
of the VAR, while Table 5.5 presents the roots of its characteristic polynomial. 
 
Figure 5.2: Inverse roots of autoregressive characteristic polynomial 
Source: Author’s computation from E-Views 9 
  
95 
Table 5.5: Roots of characteristic polynomial 
Root Modulus 
 0.945303  0.945303 
 0.900831  0.900831 
 0.841628 - 0.265675i  0.882565 
 0.841628 + 0.265675i  0.882565 
 0.414429 - 0.277926i  0.498993 
 0.414429 + 0.277926i  0.498993 
-0.387862 - 0.103379i  0.401403 
-0.387862 + 0.103379i  0.401403 
Source: Author’s computation from E-Views 9 
The AR roots graph shows the inverse roots of the characteristic polynomial, which 
implies that the characteristic roots should lie within a unit circle of values between -1 
and 1 (Harris, 1995).  
In Figure 5.2, all the roots are inside the unit circle, with none being on or outside the 
circle.  
The AR roots table (Table 5.5) indicates that the VAR is stable, since all modulus are 
less than 1. The highest root is 0.945303. 
5.4.3 Impulse response functions 
An impulse response function shows the proportion of the movements in a sequence 
or variable due to its ‘own’ shocks, versus shocks to other variables (Gujarati, 2004; 
Lütkepohl, 2006). 
In Figure 5.3 (on the next page), impulse response functions are displayed for the VAR 
up to the 10th time period. The diagonal panels from the top left to the bottom right 
indicate the impulse response functions of the variables to themselves. All stationary 
time series are expected to mean revert, and therefore are expected to decay to zero 
in the long run (Gujarati, 2004; Lütkepohl, 2006). 
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Figure 5.3: Impulse response functions  
Source: Author’s computation from E-Views 9
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As seen in Figure 5.3 above, this is the case with GD/GDP and ED, where all stationary 
time series are expected to revert to the mean, and therefore are expected to decay to 
zero in the long run. However, the electricity price is far from the mean and does not 
appear to be mean reverting in the long run. This implies that the electricity price will 
continue to rise because Eskom will keep making applications with NERSA for more tariff 
increases.  
Eskom’s revenue is also reverting away from the mean of zero and is in fact increasing. 
This implies that in the long run, much of its revenues will continue to increase, most likely 
owing to increases in the electricity price, and not necessarily increases in sales.  
In order to interpret the other impulse response functions from Figure 5.3, the discussion 
below will explain the response of each variable when one variable is shocked. The 
responses will be explained according to the following Cholesky Ordering: GD/GDP, EP, 
REV, ED. This ordering assesses the variables according to their contemporaneous 
effects.   
GD/GDP: A one standard deviation shock to the debt-to-GDP ratio causes it to decrease 
from the 1st period. It further decreases after the 2nd period. Since the study chose a 
horizon of 10 periods due to a small sample size, it can be assumed that the variables 
decay after the 10th time period. The contemporaneous effect of the debt-to-GDP ratio on 
itself shows that a large proportion of its innovation is explained by its own shock. This 
confirms the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis by Barro (1979).  
The one standard deviation shock to the debt-to-GDP ratio has no noticeable 
contemporaneous impact on the electricity price. It is only between the 2nd and 6,5th period 
that a minor decrease in the electricity price is seen.   
The one standard deviation shock to the debt-to-GDP ratio also has a minor 
contemporaneous effect on revenue. There is an initial, but minimal, increase in revenue 
in the 1st period which decreases in the 2nd time period, and decays to 0 by the 10th time 
period.  
Lastly, the one standard deviation shock to the debt-to-GDP contemporaneously 
increases Eskom’s debt from the 1st to the 3rd period. Thereafter it continues to increase 
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to the 10th horizon. The response of Eskom debt to the innovation of the debt-to-GDP 
ratio confirms that its debt was initially low after the state took on debt as its guarantee. 
However from the 3rd period, Eskom’s debt increases as they become more indebted to 
the state (Julies, 2018).  
EP: A one standard deviation shock to the electricity price has no impact on the debt-to-
GDP ratio up to the 2nd time period. A minor decrease in the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
experience in the 3rd period, however it decays over the rest of the horizon.  
A one standard deviation shock to the electricity price causes a positive shock to itself, 
with an increase from the 1st to the 3rd period. Thereafter, the electricity price decreases 
and is assumed to decay to 0 after the 10th time period.  
Eskom’s revenue has a similar response to the shock of the electricity price to itself. The 
revenue increases between the 1st and 2nd period. It increases again from the 2nd to the 
4th period, and decays to zero by the 10th period. This shows that Eskom’s revenue is 
only tied to increases in the electricity price (Lipczynski et al., 2013).  
Initially, Eskom’s debt decreases between the 1st and 2nd time period; this happens after 
a shock to the electricity price because it could be able to remedy some debt instability. 
However, after the 2nd period, debt increases again until the 3rd time period. Over the rest 
of the horizon, it decays towards zero. This is an indication that price increases alone 
cannot solve Eskom’s debt problems.  
REV: A one standard deviation shock to Eskom’s revenue creates a negative response 
from the debt-to-GDP ratio by causing it to increase from the 2nd time period. This is 
because it further deteriorates the national revenue fund. This is confirmed by Sunge et 
al.’s (2015) study, which found that the REH did not hold for Zimbabwe during the period 
from 1980 to 2013. They determined this by using an Error Correction Model (ECM) within 
an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach, where total 
government debt was one of their variables.  
A sharp increase is how the electricity price responds to a one standard deviation shock 
to Eskom’s revenue. Again, this is owing to NERSA electricity increase applications.  
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Even though Eskom debt slightly decreases between the 2nd and 3rd time period, it 
increases again after the 3rd time period. This is because an increase in revenue, through 
equity injections for instance, means it is more indebted to the state.  
ED: A one standard deviation shock to Eskom’s debt decreases the ratio from the 2nd to 
the 5th period. Thereafter, it increases, but only slightly, throughout the horizon. This could 
be in instances when Eskom obtained a state-guaranteed loan from the Word Bank. 
Initially, this did not have a negative impact on government debt/GDP, until after the 5th 
period when the state started to make repayments of the loan as a guarantee of that debt.  
A one standard deviation shock to Eskom’s debt increases the electricity price from the 
1,5th period, however, from the 6th time period, it decreases throughout the entire horizon. 
This corroborates the narrative by Altman (2008:2) that Eskom applies for unacceptably 
high tariff increases in order to repay its debt faster.  
A one standard deviation shock to Eskom’s debt initially decreases Eskom’s revenue. 
However, from the 3rd period it increases, and slowly decreases after the 6th period.   
A one standard deviation shock of Eskom’s debt to itself results in a decrease between 
the 1st and 2nd period, thereafter it increases up to the 3rd period. For the rest of the horizon 
it decays to 0 after the 10th period.  
5.4.4 Forecast error variance decomposition analysis  
A variable typically explains almost all of its forecast error variance at short horizons, and 
smaller portions at longer horizons. As previously discussed, the forecast error variance 
decomposition analysis is influenced by a method called Cholesky Ordering (Harris, 1995; 
Lütkepohl, 2006; Lütkepohl & Poskitt, 1991) and is usually analysed over a horizon of 20 
periods. However, the study chose 10 periods due to the short sample size.  
Table 5.6 below presents the variance decomposition analysis (Government debt/GDP) 
for the ten periods of the study. 
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Table 5.6: Variance decomposition analysis (GD/GDP) 
For GD/GDP 
 Period S.E. GD/GDP EP REV ED 
 1  0.047397  100.0000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.087827  99.32659  0.410362  0.103406  0.159640 
 3  0.122620  97.21287  1.077720  0.686439  1.022972 
 4  0.149397  94.59126  2.143192  1.692304  1.573243 
 5  0.167862  91.90753  3.465280  2.924982  1.702208 
 6  0.179157  89.25106  4.944452  4.241474  1.563012 
 7  0.185297  86.63957  6.428047  5.434148  1.498232 
 8  0.188637  84.12694  7.733287  6.308906  1.830866 
 9  0.191264  81.87782  8.679665  6.727559  2.714958 
 10  0.194563  80.08269  9.166241  6.705858  4.045210 
Cholesky Ordering: GD/GDP EP REV ED 
Source: Author’s computation from E-Views 9 
For GD/GDP: A large proportion of the debt-to-GDP ratio is explained by itself. Up to the 
5th time period, a shock to the ratio still explains itself at over 90%. In this decomposition 
analysis, the results confirm that the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (REH) by Barro 
(1979) holds. The REH posits that government borrowing has no effect on the economy 
because individuals have myopic foresight and adjust their spending accordingly. This 
decomposition analysis supports studies by Mosikari and Eita (2017), as well as Nkalu et 
al. (2016), who found that the REH holds.  
Up to 9.17% of the forecast error variance of the debt-to-GDP ratio is explained by the 
electricity price. This implies that much of the price increases at Eskom involve NERSA 
approving price adjustment applications from Eskom, which are later overseen by 
government through, for example, equity injections.  
Revenue and Eskom Debt also explain some forecast error variance of government 
debt/GDP but to a far lower extent, with revenue at 6.7% and 4.05%, respectively. 
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Table 5.7 below presents the variance decomposition analysis for the electricity price. 
Table 5.7: Variance decomposition analysis (EP) 
For EP 
Period S.E. GD/GDP EP REV ED 
 1  0.042637  4.874692  95.12531  0.000000  0.000000 
 2  0.075655  6.939856  87.68226  2.826115  2.551769 
 3  0.103810  6.308084  83.29662  5.019577  5.375723 
 4  0.127582  4.387011  80.50453  7.665924  7.442539 
 5  0.149219  3.858292  77.02074  10.40798  8.712982 
 6  0.172001  6.654030  70.81826  13.19992  9.327787 
 7  0.197966  12.64454  62.17863  15.83029  9.346542 
 8  0.227524  20.07234  52.76624  18.24340  8.918014 
 9  0.259715  27.15054  44.13215  20.50457  8.212734 
 10  0.293011  32.92000  36.99010  22.71312  7.376777 
Cholesky Ordering: GD/GDP EP REV ED 
Source: Author’s computation from E-Views 9 
For EP: The debt-to-GDP ratio explains 32.9% of the forecast error variance in the 
electricity price. This reiterates how the government has been increasing its own debt in 
order to appease price adjustment applications from Eskom (NERSA, 2017).  
The fact that Eskom’s revenue presents a 22.7% forecast error variance for the electricity 
price is another indication that revenues at Eskom are purely driven by the electricity 
price. This also bolsters the argument of unfair practices on the part of monopolies, where 
they manipulate the price to generate a higher revenue (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2013).  
Eskom’s debt explains less of the forecasting error of the electricity at only 7.38%.  
Table 5.8 below presents the variance decomposition analysis for revenue. 
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Table 5.8: Variance decomposition analysis (REV) 
For REV 
Period S.E. GD/GDP EP REV ED 
 1  0.090597  0.005292  20.38199  79.61272  0.000000 
 2  0.118611  0.929064  32.97378  63.06286  3.034288 
 3  0.149160  0.918014  40.39720  56.58166  2.103130 
 4  0.174014  0.677174  44.71345  52.96222  1.647160 
 5  0.197800  1.362813  46.53697  50.81956  1.280655 
 6  0.222054  4.099302  45.78730  49.03042  1.082982 
 7  0.248819  9.001889  42.83342  47.12162  1.043077 
 8  0.278624  15.14694  38.52172  45.24899  1.082344 
 9  0.310881  21.33140  33.85197  43.68996  1.126668 
 10  0.344344  26.70258  29.50995  42.66586  1.121607 
Cholesky Ordering: GD/GDP EP REV ED 
Source: Author’s computation from E-Views 9 
For REV: The electricity price explains 29.51% of the forecast error variance in Eskom’s 
revenue. This implies that Eskom has not been making tangible revenue from the efficient 
sale of electricity. This points to the fact that much of its revenue is increased by 
increasing electricity prices. This shows a great lack of productivity, according to the 
neoclassical theory of the firm (Snowdon & Vane, 2005; Varian, 2010).  
In addition, 26.7% of its revenue is explained by the debt-to-GDP ratio, a further indication 
that government bailouts, state-guaranteed loans and NERSA applications form a large 
percentage of Eskom’s revenue.  
In this decomposition analysis, the study’s stance by Keynes (1936) is supported. Keynes 
(1936) asserts that government borrowing should not be used to support public entities. 
Instead, it should be used for productive public capital expenditure. This is also the stance 
by Wheeler (1999) who has found that the REH does not hold, and government borrowing 
does have an adverse effect on the economy. Eskom debt has a lower forecast variance 
of 1.14%, which shows that it is not a significant influence on Eskom’s revenue.  
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Table 5.9 below presents the variance decomposition analysis of Eskom debt. 
Table 5.9: Variance decomposition analysis (ED) 
For ED 
Period S.E. GD/GDP EP REV ED 
 1  0.203308  3.10E-09  18.26727  0.751056  80.98167 
 2  0.226984  0.064329  20.13367  2.974872  76.82713 
 3  0.250600  0.718375  23.97790  2.930613  72.37311 
 4  0.272498  2.880471  26.42084  4.849852  65.84883 
 5  0.295868  6.651708  27.76144  6.607259  58.97959 
 6  0.323246  11.69276  27.46811  9.159260  51.67987 
 7  0.353393  17.18378  26.12769  11.85950  44.82903 
 8  0.385901  22.38467  24.20212  14.72217  38.69105 
 9  0.419342  26.83310  22.14234  17.57470  33.44986 
 10  0.452629  30.33573  20.19991  20.37192  29.09244 
Cholesky Ordering: GD/GDP EP REV ED 
Source: Author’s computation from E-Views 9 
ED: The forecast error variance for Eskom Debt is explained by the debt-to-GDP ratio, 
and it is up to 30.34%. The adverse effect of government borrowing is illuminated once 
more in this decomposition analysis.  
The Modigliani and Miller (1958) paradigm confirms that Eskom is at liberty to secure 
internal financing and higher debt levels, not only because of hedging but because the 
state guarantees its debt.  
Eskom’s revenue and electricity price explain a large portion of Eskom debt’s forecast 
error variance at 20.37% and 20.2% respectively. 
The next section presents the results of the Error Correction Model. 
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5.5 LONG RUN EQUATIONS, RESIDUAL SERIES, AND MCKINNON 
RESPONSE SURFACE TESTING  
The following sub-section will present the results for the Error Correction Model (ECM) of 
the current study. The results for the long run cointegrating equations will also be 
discussed. The section will also conduct a residual series test, McKinnon response 
surface testing, and a two-step Engle-Granger cointegration test. An ECM will be 
constructed, after which post-diagnostic tests will be run.  
The model below is a base model used to construct ECM:   
𝐸𝐷
𝐺𝐷
=  𝑓 (
𝑅
𝐸𝑃
, 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐹𝐹, 𝐶𝑅, 𝐷𝐴𝑅, 𝐺𝑉𝐴) … … ………………………………………………… (5.2) 
In the model above , the dependent variable was generated as Eskom debt as a 
proportion of government debt. The intention was to generate a variable that incorporates 
how much of government’s debt is comprised of Eskom’s debt.  
Since GDP was included in the VAR, the study saw it fit to include GVA into the ECM to 
see if any supply side economic activities influence Eskom debt as a proportion of 
government debt. GVA is a sector-specific measure of economic activity, and Mohr (2016) 
notes that GVA is measured according to the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors of 
the economy.  
This study has discussed the importance of Eskom as a monopoly supplier of electricity 
(Eberhard, 2004). Thus, all three sectors are dependent on the utility to supply their goods 
and services. Therefore, it would be useful to estimate these sectors’ value added as it 
relates to Eskom debt relative to government debt.  
Table 5.10 below presents the correlation matrix of the base model which will be used to 
construct the ECM. This is a covariance analysis which indicates the presence of 
multicollinearity amongst the variables. When a variable is highly correlated with one or 
more variables in a model, it suggests that it can be linearly predicted with a high degree 
of accuracy. However, the estimates of the model will be biased owing to the fact that one 
will not be able to completely isolate one estimate from another. Thus, a correlation matrix 
is important because it indicates which variables are suitable for inclusion in the model. 
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Table 5.10: The base model’s correlation matrix  
Correlation 
Probability 
ED/GD  R/EP  STAFF  CR  DAR  GVA  
ED/GD 1.000 
------ 










































Source: Author’s computation from E-Views 9 
Where: 
() indicates the p-values and 
* Statistically significant at a 10% level 
** Statistically significant at a 5% level 
*** Statistically significant at a 1% level 
 
Table 5.10 shows the correlation matrix of the ECM, while the p-values show the 
significance of the correlation between all the independent variables and their dependent 
variable (Steiger, 1980).  
The null hypothesis is that there is no correlation, but when the p-value is statistically 
significant at either a 10%, 5%, or 1% level of significance, one can reject the null 
hypothesis in favour of the presence of correlation. According to the correlation matrix, all 
the variables have a significant correlation with the dependent variable, apart from the 
staff and the debt-to-assets ratio.  
While the correlation matrix is important, for an ECM, the suitability of the model is 
generally determined by the significance of the variables when the long run equation is 
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estimated. This significance is determined by the variables’ p-values. As such, the model 
will still include staff and the debt-to-assets ratio, and thereafter determine their 
significance.  
5.5.1 Long run cointegrating equation of the base model 
Table 5.11 presents the long run estimation of the following variables: Eskom debt as a 
proportion of government debt, revenue as a result of price changes, staff numbers, the 
current ratio, debt-to-assets ratio and GVA. 
Table 5.11: Long run estimation of the base model 
Dependent variable: ED_GD 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
R_EP -0.075630 0.026394 -2.865401 0.0080 
STAFF 0.080493 0.011745 6.853148 0.0000 
CR -0.006318 0.010814 -0.584219 0.5639 
DAR 0.012579 0.021632 0.581523 0.5657 
GVA 0.045983 0.016049 2.865246 0.0080 













Sample size = 
33 
Sample period = 
1985 - 2017 






+ 0.080𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐹𝐹 − 0.006𝐶𝑅 + 0.013𝐷𝐴𝑅 + 0.046𝐺𝑉𝐴 − 0.142…….… (5.3) 
 
Table 5.11 above shows the initial long run equation estimated for this model. While the 
current ratio and debt-to-assets are insignificant, their signs can still be interpreted as 
correct, according to risk management theory.  
The following discussion is an interpretation of equation 5.3:  
Revenue/Price (R_EP): A 1% increase in revenue due to an electricity price increase will 
decrease Eskom’s debt as a proportion of government debt by 0.08%. According to the 
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neoclassical theory of the firm, an increase in price will increase revenue, with 
subsequently positive results on a company’s balance sheet (Varian, 2010). This is line 
with the study by Yazdanfar and Öhman (2014), who posit that when a firm’s financial 
performance is positive, the firm will have a subsequent decrease in debt.  
STAFF: There is a positive relationship between the number of staff at Eskom and 
Eskom’s debt as a proportion of government debt. Thus a 1% increase in staff numbers 
will increase Eskom’s debt as a proportion of government debt by 0.08%. Snowdon and 
Vane (2005) have classified labour as one of the inputs of production, and it is therefore 
a measure of productivity. This implies that Eskom has not been productive, despite 
increasing their staff numbers. This indicates decreasing marginal returns to labour.  
Current ratio (CR): There is a negative relationship between the current ratio and 
Eskom’s debt as a proportion of government debt. This is the expected relationship, 
according to risk management theory. This implies that a 1% increase in the current ratio 
will decrease Eskom’s debt as a proportion of government debt by 0.01%. According to 
Odalo (2016), as a company becomes more liquid, it has an increased ability to pay off 
its short term debt obligations. However, this is a significantly small effect. This is 
indicative of the fact that Eskom is in a poor financial state, and that it has been taking on 
far more debt than is feasible. This is supported by Modigliani and Miller (1958) who 
encourage high debt financing. The author of this study calculated Eskom’s current ratio 
from its financial statements of 1985 – 2017 and found that the company is illiquid (Eskom 
Financial Statements, 1985 – 2017). This is to say that if it were to be sold, it would not 
be able to settle its short-term debts in 12 months (Odalo, 2016).  
Debt-to-assets ratio (DAR): There is a positive relationship between the debt-to-assets 
ratio and Eskom’s debt as a proportion of government debt, and according to risk 
management, this is the expected relationship. A 1% increase in the debt-to-assets ratio 
will increase Eskom’s debt as a proportion of government debt by 0.013%. While this 
percentage may seem small or significant, it still holds that high leverage is associated 
with poor financial performance (Gurbuz et al., 2016; Yazdanfar & Öhman, 2014). The 
author of this study also calculated the debt-to-assets ratio from Eskom’s financial 
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statements of 1985 – 2017, and found that the company is insolvent (Eskom Financial 
Statements, 1985 – 2017).  
Gross Value Added (GVA): It is surprising that there is a positive relationship between 
GVA and Eskom’s debt as a proportion of government debt. This is because it is expected 
that as the economy becomes more productive, Eskom’s productivity will also increase, 
thereby increasing its sales, and ultimately reducing its debt (Mohr 2016). Nevertheless, 
the interpretation is that a 1% increase in GVA will result in a 0.045% increase in Eskom’s 
debt as a proportion of government debt.  
Table 5.12 below presents the results for a long run estimation of the base model. This 
table presents the long run estimates that include only significant variables.  
Table 5.12: Long run estimation of the base model with significant variables 
Dependent variable: ED_GD 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
R_EP -0.071187 0.024310 -2.928308 0.0066 
STAFF 0.084300 0.010393 8.111120 0.0000 
GVA 0.039230 0.012632 3.105692 0.0042 
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+ 0.084𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐹𝐹 + 0.039𝐺𝑉𝐴 − 0.119………………………..… (5.4) 
 
Table 5.12 depicts the output of the long run cointegrating equation, when only significant 
variables are considered. As a result, the base model has excluded the current ratio and 
debt-to-assets ratio. The interpretation of the coefficients only differs slightly. In equation 
5.4, a 1% increase in revenue from an increase in the electricity will decrease Eskom’s 
debt as a proportion of government debt by 0.07%.  
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A 1% increase in staff numbers will increase Eskom’s debt as a proportion of government 
debt by 0.08%. And lastly, a one percent increase in GVA will increase Eskom’s debt as 
a proportion of government debt by 0.04%.   
5.5.2 Tests for cointegration 
This section presents the following tests for cointegration: residual series and McKinnon 
surface response testing. 
5.5.2.1 Residual series 
Table 5.13 presents the results of a unit root test on the residual series test. 
Table 5.13: Residual series 
Dependent variable: D(RESIDUAL) 
Null Hypothesis:  RESIDUAL HAS A UNIT ROOT 
32 observations after adjustment (1986 – 2017) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Prob.   







*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
Source: Author’s computation from E-Views 9 
According to Asteriou and Hall (2016), one method of testing for cointegration is to test 
the residual series of the long run cointegrating equation. Table 5.13 shows the results 
for such a test which indicates the presence of cointegration.  
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However, in order to be more precise, the study has to conduct MacKinnon (1996) surface 
response testing which takes the number of parameters into consideration.  
5.5.2.2 McKinnon surface response testing  
𝐶(1) =  −4.9587 +  (−22.140) ∗ (
1
33





=  −5.66385  
𝐶(5) =  −4.4185 +  (−13.641) ∗ (
1
33





=  −4.85129  
𝐶(10) =  −4.1327 +  (−10.638) ∗ (
1
33





=  −4.46009  
The results from the MacKinnon surface response testing show that -2.99576, the test 
statistic obtained from an ADF test of the residual series, is not the least negative of all 
these surface response tests. Hence, the study fails to reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration.   
5.6 ENGLE-GRANGER COINTEGRATION TEST  
This test was important for the study because it was the most reliable tool which could be 
used to detect cointegration. Table 5.14 presents the results of the two-step Engle-
Granger cointegration test. 
Table 5.14: Single equation cointegration test 
Null Hypothesis: Series are not cointegrated 
33 observations (1985 -2017)  
Dependent tau-statistic Prob.* z-statistic Prob.* 
ED_GD -5.543441  0.0055 -74.45036  0.0000 
R_EP -4.712966  0.0304 -26.14163  0.0298 
STAFF -4.835836  0.0238 -33.88528  0.0017 
GVA -4.211512  0.0789 -23.35636  0.0663 
Source: Author’s computation from E-Views 9 
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Since the residual series and surface response testing gave conflicting results, the study 
had to use a more robust test for cointegration. The study used the single equation ECM, 
hence, the Engle-Granger cointegration test was conducted on the long run cointegrating 
equation with significant variables, and it was established that cointegration exists. This 
was established from the significant tau and z statistics of Eskom debt as a proportion of 
government debt.  
5.7 ERROR CORRECTION MODEL  
Table 5.15 presents the results of the output for the study’s ECM error correction model. 
Table 5.15: Output for error correction model 
Dependent variable: D(ED_GD) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(R_EP) -0.056751 0.024191 -2.345981 0.0263 
D(STAFF) 0.060630 0.018515 3.274626 0.0028 
RESID01(-1) -0.991468 0.209867 -4.724279 0.0001 
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+  0.061∆𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐹𝐹 − 0.99𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐷(−1) + 0.001 …………..…. (5.5) 
According to the ECM in equation 5.5, a 1% increase in the revenue as a result of an 
increase in the electricity price, will result in a 0.06% decrease in Eskom’s debt as a 
proportion of government debt. This is again in line with the economic theory which states 
that an increase in price will increase a firm’s revenue (Varian, 2010). Klimczak (2007) 
also notes that an improvement in the financial performance of a company will decrease 
its level of debt.  
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The positive relationship between staff numbers and Eskom’s debt as a proportion of 
government debt is also unexpected, according to economic theory. This is because staff 
numbers are considered as labour, which is one of the inputs to production and should 
increase productivity (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2013).  
The model indicates that a 1% increase in staff numbers will increase Eskom’s debt as a 
proportion of government debt by 0.06%. Therefore, Eskom is experiencing decreasing 
marginal returns on labour.  
The residual’s coefficient is the error correction term in the ECM. It indicates the speed at 
which the previous time period’s disequilibrium will adjust in the current time period (Engle 
& Granger, 1980). For the ECM above, the error correction term is quite high, which 
indicates that the economy will move back to its steady state at a fast speed of 99%. This 
is almost equal to one time period, which in the case of this study’s observations is 1 year. 
GVA was not included in the ECM, since the Engle and Granger cointegration test showed 
it was not cointegrated.  
5.7.1 ECM post-estimation diagnostic tests 
Table 5.16 presents the results of the post-estimation diagnostic tests which were 
performed on the ECM. They included the Jarque Bera test, Ramsey RESET test, Ljung-
Box Q statistic test, Breusch-Godfrey LM test, ARCH LM test, and White’s test.  
The diagnostic tests are conducted to ensure that the residuals of the ECM are normally 














JB (2) = 
 3.047  
0.218 
Fail to reject H0.  





LR(2) =   
11.21314 
0.0820 
Fail to reject H0.  
No misspecification at the 




correlation up to 6th 
order 
LBQ(6) =  
7.528 
0.962 
Fail to reject H0.  










Fail to reject H0.   
No serial correlation 




Fail to reject H0.  









Fail to reject H0.  
No heteroscedasticity of 
general form 
Source: Author’s computation from E-Views 9 
The post-estimation diagnostic tests in Table 5.16 indicate that the coefficients of this 
ECM can be trusted because its residuals are normally distributed, there is no 
heteroskedasticity, no autocorrelation and the model is correctly specified.  
5.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the graphical analysis, descriptive statistics and unit root tests of 
all the variables in the study. The chapter provided concise evidence from the VAR’s 
impulse response functions and forecast variance decomposition analysis. According to 
the impulse response functions, a one standard deviation shock to the debt-to-GDP ratio 
has a minimal impact on the electricity price, Eskom’s revenue and Eskom debt. This 
shows that an innovation to the debt-to-GDP ratio explains a large proportion of itself.  
A one standard deviation shock to the electricity price has a positive response from 
Eskom’s revenue and its debt. A one standard deviation shock to Eskom’s revenue has 
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a positive response from the electricity price and Eskom’s debt. A one standard deviation 
shock to Eskom’s debt has a positive response from the electricity price and Eskom’s 
revenue. 
Up to 9.17% of the forecast error variance of the debt-to-GDP ratio is explained by the 
electricity price. The model also showed that the debt-to-GDP ratio explains 32.9% of the 
forecast error variance in the electricity price. The same model shows that the electricity 
price explains 29.51% of the forecast error variance in Eskom’s revenue. In addition, 
26.7% of its revenue is explained by the debt-to-GDP ratio. The forecast error variance 
for Eskom debt is explained by the debt to GDP ratio and it is up to 30.34%.  
According to the ECM, a 1% increase in the revenue as a result of an increase in the 
electricity, will result in a 0.06% decrease in Eskom’s debt as a proportion of government 
debt. The model indicates that a 1% increase in staff numbers will increase Eskom’s debt 
as a proportion of government debt by 0.06%.  
The error correction term is quite high, which indicates that the economy will move back 
to its steady state at a fast speed of 99%. This is almost equal to one time period, which 
in the case of this study’s observations is 1 year. 
In summary, this chapter has shown that the government has been increasing its own 
debt in order to appease price adjustment applications from Eskom. In addition, revenues 
at Eskom are purely driven by the electricity price, which means no tangible revenue has 
been earned from the efficient sale of electricity. This shows a great lack of productivity. 
This means much of its revenue is increases stems from increases electricity prices. 
Lastly, the debt-to-GDP ratio is adversely affected by Eskom’s debt, since the state is a 






This chapter will present an overall summary of the study. The findings of the study are 
detailed in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 discusses the recommendations, while Section 6.4 
outlines areas for further research.  
6.2 FINDINGS FROM THE STUDY  
This study had three objectives, namely: 
1. To determine how the financial performance of Eskom affected government debt in 
the period from 1985 to 2017.  
2. To determine how the financial performance of Eskom affected its own debt in the 
period from 1985 to 2017. 
3. To identify the causes of the crisis at Eskom from a financial perspective. 
6.2.1 Objective 1 
To determine how the financial performance of Eskom affected government debt in the 
period from 1985 to 2017.  
The study achieved this objective by estimating a VAR’s impulse response functions and 
variance decomposition analysis. According to the impulse response functions, a one 
standard deviation shock to the debt-to-GDP ratio has a minimal impact on the electricity 
price, Eskom’s revenue and Eskom debt. This shows that an innovation to the debt-to-
GDP ratio is largely explained by itself.  
A one standard deviation shock to the electricity price has a positive response from 
Eskom’s revenue and its debt. A one standard deviation shock to Eskom’s revenue has 
a positive response from the electricity price and Eskom’s debt. A one standard deviation 
shock to Eskom’s debt has a positive response from the electricity price and Eskom’s 
revenue.  
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According to the forecast error variance decomposition analysis, up to 9.17% of the 
forecast error variance of the debt-to-GDP ratio is explained by the electricity price. The 
model also showed that the debt-to-GDP ratio explains 32.9% of the forecast error 
variance in the electricity price. The same model shows that the electricity price explains 
29.51% of the forecast error variance in Eskom’s revenue. In addition, 26.7% of its 
revenue is explained by the debt-to-GDP ratio. The forecast error variance for Eskom 
debt is explained by the debt-to-GDP ratio, and it is up to 30.34%. 
It has been found that Eskom’s poor financial performance is a strong contributor to public 
debt and that Eskom is one of the state’s biggest contingent liabilities. 
6.2.2 Objective 2 
To determine how the financial performance of Eskom affected its own debt in the period 
from 1985 to 2017. 
The study achieved this objective by estimating an ECM. The results of the ECM showed 
that a 1% increase in the revenue as a result of an increase in the electricity price, will 
result in a 0.06% decrease in Eskom’s debt as a proportion of government debt.  
A 1% increase in staff numbers will increase Eskom’s debt as a proportion of government 
debt by 0.06%. Therefore, Eskom is experiencing decreasing marginal returns on labour.  
The residual’s coefficient is the error correction term in the ECM. It indicates the speed at 
which the previous time period’s disequilibrium will adjust in the current time period (Engle 
& Granger, 1980). The error correction term is quite high, which indicates that the 
economy will move back to its steady state at a fast speed of 99%. This is almost equal 
to one time period, which in the case of this study’s observations is 1 year.  
6.2.3 Objective 3 
To identify the causes of the crisis at Eskom from a financial perspective 
The study has achieved this objective from the discussion of the background to the study, 
and the discussion of the theoretical and empirical literature. The study found that a low 
liquidity ratio, high debt-to assets ratio, and high company debt were the leading cause 
of Eskom’s poor financial performance. However, what is important to note is that state 
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intervention also had a negative impact on Eskom’s financials. In 1984, the De Villiers 
Commission prescribed to Eskom that they should not charge cost-reflective tariffs. This 
has contributed to Eskom’s long-term debt instability due to not receiving adequate 
revenue with which to effectively maintain its generation capacity, transmission lines and 
other operations (Steyn, 2016; Kantor, 1988; Van der Heijden, 2013). Corruption has also 
had a strong influence on Eskom’s poor financial status (Blom, 2018; Van der Heijden, 
2013). 
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS  
There are a few recommendations which can be made regarding Eskom’s financial crisis. 
• First, it is clear from the literature that of all the technologies associated with electricity 
generation, coal is the most expensive (GTAC, 2017). As such, it is important for 
Eskom to increase its research and development (R&D) in experimental research to 
discover new and cheaper ways to generate electricity. Mustapha, Kruss and Ralphs 
(2018) have found many concerning factors about SOEs and R&D. They found that 
many SOEs have been underspending on their budgets for R&D, have been 
recruiting significantly more technicians than scientists, and that they have been 
relying on institutions, such as the CSIR, to supply them with experimental research 
related to their respective industries. They recommend that the aforementioned 
oversights be addressed, and SOEs should search for local research expertise 
before employing international services, which was also found to be a major concern 
(Mustapha et al., 2018).  
• Secondly, privatisation is always a looming recommendation for SOEs and has been 
so for many decades. President Cyril Ramaphosa, in this year’s State of The Nation 
Address (SONA) announced that there will be an unbundling of Eskom into three 
entities, namely, generation, transmission and distribution (Minaar, 2019). They are 
intended to be operated as separate businesses because of the urgent need for 
Eskom to function independently of the state. There is a strong suggestion of 
privatisation here and the literature has been pointing towards the introduction of 
IPPs for generation capacity. As such, there is uncertainty about employment at 
Eskom, and rightfully so because when Telkom was partially privatised, it shed jobs 
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from 61, 000 employees to just 15, 000 (Whitfield, 2019). However, privatisation 
appears to be a plausible solution, eventually.  
• Lastly, an extension of this recommendation is fiscal consolidation. Since President 
Ramaphosa announced the unbundling of Eskom, he has alluded to a fiscal 
consolidation strategy for Eskom. Fiscal consolidations are usually applied to an 
entire economy in the form of a fiscal squeeze to decrease public debt (Labus & 
Labus, 2016). The conditions that warrant fiscal consolidation are usually high 
inflation, high public debt and sluggish growth (Tsibouris et al., 2006). South Africa 
has the latter two, which is another reason for fiscal consolidation, apart from Eskom 
being a contingent liability. Moody’s has also warned South Africa that Eskom has a 
large impact on the fiscal credibility of the state. Therefore, consolidation also 
appears to be a strong international recommendation (Paton, 2019). Nevertheless, 
President Ramaphosa announced during the SONA on 20 June 2019, that an 
immediate R230 billion is to be given to Eskom over the next 10 years because it 
cannot be allowed to fail (Bhengu, 2019).  
6.4 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The model can be estimated using the budget deficit to obtain more robust results. 
Exchange rates, namely, the rand/dollar exchange rate can be included in the model to 
bolster the notion that some of Eskom’s debt is denoted in foreign currency, especially 
that of the World Bank’s. Although the electricity price contains the element of inflation, 
one could also include interest rates in order to have an isolated view of how interest rates 
behave in the model throughout the stipulated time period.  
6.5 CONCLUSION 
This study attempted to investigate and understand the extent to which Eskom bailouts 
have impacted on government debt. The study achieved this purpose through a 
systematic process of literature study and empirical testing. The Keynesian theory of 
government debt was used as a point of departure for the study and was used to justify 
the dependent variable in the model. The Modigliani-Miller paradigm, agency theory, 
stakeholder theory and new institutional economics approach were used to justify the 
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independent variables that were used in the study. The variables included Eskom’s 
revenue, the electricity price, staff numbers, the current ratio, debt-to-assets ratio, GVA 
and GDP. Given the variables mentioned above, a VAR and ECM were used for the 
study’s empirical analysis. The results of the study showed a significant relationship 
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